## Appendix A. Palestinian National Movement Group Strength Data

| Year | Hierarchy | Evidence for Movement Hierarchy |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | L1: PLO<br>C2: ANM<br>C3: JCP<br>C4: Fatah<br><br>7 Subordinates | The PLO had close to 3,500 fighters by the end of the year under Arab state control, the ANM had 2,500 members, the JCP 2,000, and Fatah 1,000; other groups much smaller[1] |
| 1966 | L1: PLO<br>C2: ANM<br>C3: JCP<br>C4: Fatah<br><br>9 Subordinates | The PLO had up to 12,000 fighters being trained in Syria and Gaza, although they remained under Arab state control[2], the ANM had 2,500 members (15-20 trained fighters), the JCP 2,000, and Fatah had 200-300 fighters just before the 1967 war, but 2000 members later that year[3]; other groups much smaller[4] |
| 1967 | L1: PLO<br>C2: ANM/PFLP<br>C3: JCP<br>C4: Fatah<br><br>12 Subordinates | The PLO had up to 12,000 fighters being trained in Syria and Gaza, although they remained under Arab state control[5], the ANM had 2,500 members and was the strongest in Lebanon[6], the JCP 2,000, and Fatah 1,000 (500 in its armed wing Al-Asifah); other groups much smaller[7] |
| 1968 | L1: PLO<br>C2: PFLP<br>C3: Fatah<br>C4: Saiqa<br><br>11 Subordinates | The PLO and PFLP had more members than Fatah at the beginning of 1968, but the focus on guerillas started to shift the balance: Fatah had 500 fighters in the Jordan Valley, the PLO had 400, the PFLP had 350, the POLP had 60 (and 275 members), and newly formed Saiqa had 400 in Jordan and Syria[8]; the Palestine National Congress in July (after Fatah's rise due to Karameh) gave 50 seats to the PLO, 38 to Fatah, 10 the PFLP[9] |
| 1969 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: PLF/PLA<br>C3: Saiqa<br>C4: PFLP<br>C5: DFLP<br><br>12 Subordinates | Fatah had 3,000 fighters in Jordan, while Saiqa, PLF/PLA, PFLP had 1,000[10], the ALF 300, the PFLP-GC had 150 fighters when it split from the PFLP[11]; at the February Palestine National Congress, Fatah had 33 seats, the PLF/PLA 15, Saiqa and PFLP 12 each, and Fatah took over leadership of the PLO[12]; the DFLP split from the PFLP and had fewer members but equal or greater representation in the PLO and its central committee[13] |
| 1970 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Saiqa<br>C3: PLF/PLA<br>C4: PFLP<br>C5: DFLP<br><br>10 Subordinates | Fatah had 4,500 fighters in Jordan, Saiqa, PLF/PLA, and PFLP had 1,500 fighters each[14], some estimates ranged higher but with similar hierarchical order: Fatah, Saiqa and PLF/PLA with 5,000-10,000 (although most of the PLF/PLA under Arab state or Fatah control) the PFLP and DFLP with 1,000-3,000 (and PFLP up to 4,500 with militia)[15]; the PFLP-GC, ALF, OAP, AOLP, PPSF, POLP and the JCP each had 300 fighters[16]; at the Palestine National Congress Saiqa had 15 seats to Fatah's 33, while PFLP refused the 8 seats it was offered and demanded 15 like Saiqa; Fatah had 5 seats on the PLO Central Committee, Saiqa 3, DFLP 2, and PFLP, ALF, PFLP-GC, AOLP, OAP, PPSF, POLP each had 1[17] |

[1] Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 50–52, 84–87, 108, 111, 115, 118; John W. Amos, *Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement*, Pergamon Policy Studies (Pergamon Press, 1980), 57; Nasser Youssef, interview by Author, June 2013.

[2] Amos, *Palestinian Resistance*, 186.

[3] Jamal Nassar, *The Palestine Liberation Organization: From Armed Struggle to the Declaration of Independence* (New York: Praeger, 1991); Ehud Yaari, *Strike Terror; the Story of Fatah* (New York: Sabra Books, 1970), 282.

[4] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 50–52, 84–87, 108, 111, 115, 118; Amos, *Palestinian Resistance*, 57; Nasser Youssef, interview.

[5] Amos, *Palestinian Resistance*, 186.

[6] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 108, 111, 188.

[7] Ibid., 50–52, 84–87, 115, 118; Amos, *Palestinian Resistance*, 57; Nasser Youssef, interview.

[8] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 177, 181–82, 185, 231.

[9] William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 69–70.

[10] Hal Ford, "ESAU L: The Fedayeen," Intelligence Report (Central Intelligence Agency, January 1971), 5, 61; Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 181–82, 229, 236.

[11] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 229.

[12] Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, 71.

[13] Ibid., 92–93.

[14] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 181–82.

[15] Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, 66; Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 256; Bard E. O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), 253.

[16] Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, 66; Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 250–51, 263.

[17] Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, 72–73, 91–93.

| Year | Hierarchy | Description |
|------|-----------|-------------|
| 1971 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Saiqa<br>C3: PFLP<br>13 Subordinates | At the Palestine National Congress, Fatah had 33 seats, Saiqa and the PFLP 12, DFLP 8, PFLP-GC 4, all other groups combined had 4[18]; Fatah had 7,500 fighters in Syria and Saiqa 3,000[19]; Arafat and Fatah largely assumed control of the PLA/PLF by early 1971, with Arab states controlling the rest |
| 1972 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Saiqa<br>C3: PFLP<br>11 Subordinates | At the previous Palestine National Congress, Fatah had 33 seats, Saiqa and the PFLP had 12, DFLP had 8, PFLP-GC had 4, all other groups combined had 4[20]; Fatah had 7,500 fighters in Syria and Saiqa had 3,000[21] |
| 1973 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Saiqa<br>C3: PFLP<br>10 Subordinates | At the Palestine National Congress, Fatah had 33 seats, Saiqa and the PFLP had 12, the DFLP and ALF had 8, and the PFLP-GC had 3[22]; Saiqa had 3,000 fighters in Syria, while PFLP had an average estimate of 2,500[23] |
| 1974 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Saiqa<br>C3: PFLP<br>11 Subordinates | Fatah had 6,000-10,000 fighters, Saiqa 2,000-5,000, PFLP 500 but proportionately higher number of designated PLO seats, ALF had 600 members, DFLP and PFLP-GC had 300, PSF 100[24]; the PLO was granted $50 million subsidy from Arab states, much of which was controlled by Fatah[25] |
| 1975 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Saiqa<br>C3: PFLP<br>10 Subordinates | Saiqa had 4,000 fighters, the second largest group after Fatah, which had 10,000 fighters[26] |
| 1976 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Saiqa<br>C3: PFLP<br>10 Subordinates | The PFLP and Saiqa suffered heavy losses and defections, respectively, amidst the Lebanese civil war[27]; Saiqa nonetheless estimated at 6,000 fighters[28]; The PFLP received 1 million pounds from UAE in addition to donations from Libya, although Fatah had larger amounts of funding[29] |
| 1977 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Saiqa<br>C3: PFLP<br>C4: DFLP<br>10 Subordinates | At the PNC in March, Fatah had 36 seats, Saiqa 15, DFLP 12, ALF 9, PFLP-GC 8, while PFLP continued to refuse to take its seats[30] |
| 1978 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Saiqa<br>C3: PFLP<br>C4: DFLP<br>9 Subordinates | Fatah has 9,000-10,000 fighters in Lebanon, more than any other group[31]; Two-thirds of the Arab Defense Fund (also called *Sumud* or "steadfastness") donated by Arab states—$400 million/year for the next ten years—was controlled by Fatah[32] |
| 1979 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Saiqa<br>C3: PFLP<br>C4: DFLP<br>11 Subordinates | Fatah's economic dominance from the Arab Defense Fund was somewhat balanced by Libya's Gaddafi, who gave subsidies to the PFLP-GC ($18 million), DFLP ($13 million), PFLP ($12 million), and Saiqa ($4.8 million)[33] |
| 1980 | L1: Fatah | Libyan aid help the DFLP increase in size from 800 in 1979 to 2,000-3,900 fighters in 1980[34]; |

[18] Ibid., 139.

[19] David Ethan Corbin, "Allies, Agents, and Proxies? Hierarchy and the Costs of State-Armed Group Alignment: A Case Study of Syria, 1963-2010" (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2013), 192.

[20] Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, 139.

[21] Corbin, "Allies, Agents, and Proxies," 192.

[22] Alain Gresh, *The PLO: The Struggle Within: Towards an Independent Palestinian State* (London: Zed Books, 1988), 137.

[23] Corbin, "Allies, Agents, and Proxies," 192; "A Look at the Palestine Liberation Organization," *New York Times*, November 13, 1974; As 'ad AbuKhalil, "Internal Contradictions in the PFLP: Decision Making and Policy Orientation," *Middle East Journal* 41, no. 3 (July 1, 1987): 363.

[24] Amos, *Palestinian Resistance*, 58, 99; Juan de Onis, "The Divided Leaders of Palestinian Palestinian Resistance," *New York Times*, May 26, 1974; "A Look at the Palestine Liberation Organization."

[25] Amos, *Palestinian Resistance*, 164.

[26] Michael Curtis, Joseph Neyer, and Chaim Waxman, eds., *The Palestinians: People, History, Politics* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1975), 140–41.

[27] Corbin, "Allies, Agents, and Proxies," 219.

[28] Associated Press, "Lebanese Areas Calmed by Syrian Troops, Tanks," *The Spokesman-Review*, June 3, 1976.

[29] AbuKhalil, "Internal Contradictions in the PFLP," 370.

[30] "The PNC: Historical Background," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 16, no. 4 (1987): 151.

[31] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 425; "Arafat's P.L.O. Rule Is Challenged," *New York Times*, May 25, 1978.

[32] Helena Cobban, "The PLO in the Mid- 1980s: Between the Gun and the Olive Branch," *International Journal* 38, no. 4 (Autumn 1983): 642; Amos, *Palestinian Resistance*, 164.

[33] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 486.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | C2: Saiqa<br>C3: PFLP<br>C4: DFLP<br>10 Subordinates | Saiqa had 6,000 fighters in Lebanon and the PFLP had 3,000[35] |
| 1981 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Saiqa<br>C3: PFLP<br>S4: DFLP<br>11 Subordinates | The PPSF and PLF were brought into the PNC[36]; Libyan aid continued to support Fatah challengers amidst civil war in Lebanon, although attempts by the PFLP and DFLP to gain greater representation and funding in the PLO were unsucessful[37] |
| 1982 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: PFLP<br>15 Subordinates | Fatah had 10,000-15,000 fighters, the PFLP 4,000, Saiqa, DFLP and PCP had close to 3,000[38]; Fatah controlled two-thirds of $300 million *Sumud* funds from Arab states[39]; in poll of college students, 42% supported Fatah and 58% opposed it[40] |
| 1983 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: PFLP<br>C3: DFLP<br>C4: Fatah-Intifada<br>13 Subordinates | Saiqa had 2,000 fighters as the PFLP and DFLP surpassed it in the hierarchy[41]; a significant number of Fatah dissidents split, formed Fatah-Intifada, and allied with the PFLP-GC, Saiqa, and PPSF as they gained support from Syria and Libya[42]; the PFLP and DFLP's neutrality led to the loss of Libyan aid[43]; in one key clash in Lebanon in September, Fatah, the PFLP, and the DFLP each had 300 fighters, while Fatah-Intifada and the PFLP-GC had 400 combined[44] |
| 1984 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Fatah-Intifada<br>C3: PFLP<br>13 Subordinates | Fatah-Intifada had 4,000-5,000 fighters and 10,000-15,000 members[45]; the PFLP had 4,000 members and the PFLP-GC 500[46]; in Birzeit Univeristy student body elections, the Fatah/DFLP ticket received 39% of the vote to the PFLP/PCP ticket's 27%[47]; Fatah-Intifada, the PFLP, the PFLP-GC, Saiqa, the PPSF, the PLF formed the anti-Fatah alliance Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF); Fatah held the PNC anyway with the ALF and PLF, and reserved seats for the PFLP, DFLP, and PCP[48] |
| 1985 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Fatah-Intifada<br>14 Subordinates | Conflict around Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon led to splits from the anti-Fatah PNSF and tensions between its groups and Syria, Fatah-Intifada lost 2,000 fighters to defection[49]; In Birzeit University student body elections, Fatah received 38% of the vote to the PFLP/DFLP/PCP's combined 35%, while Fatah trounced the PFLP in the Al-Najah University elections, 49% to 10%[50]; the DFLP's strength declined from its early 1980s peak[51] |
| 1986 | H1: Fatah<br>14 Subordinates | "Arafat had attained an unprecedented concentration of power"[52]; Abu Nidal had 500-800 members that expanded by adding defectors from Fatah-Intifada, which fell to under 1,000 fighters[53]; Arafat gained control of a far larger percentage of PLO funds for Fatah by incorporating the PLA budget under the PLO's Palestine National Fund[54] |
| 1987 | H1: Fatah<br>15 Subordinates | Fatah had far more fighters than its rivals: 7,000 as compared to 800 for the PFLP and 500 for the DFLP[55]; the PCP joined the PNC for the first time while the PFLP and DFLP returned after a multi-year boycott[56] |
| 1988 | H1: Fatah | Fatah had $7-8 billion in funding, far more than any other group[57]; Fatah had 6,000-8,000 |

[34] Ibid., 487; Corbin, "Allies, Agents, and Proxies," 289.

[35] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 459; Amos, *Palestinian Resistance*, 71.

[36] "The PNC," 152.

[37] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 503.

[38] Aaron David Miller, *The PLO and the Politics of Survival* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 54, 126–27; Meron Benvenisti, Danny Rubinstein, and Ziad Abu-Zayad, *The West Bank Handbook: A Political Lexicon* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, 1986), 26; Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 487.

[39] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 437, 441, 479–481; Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 14.

[40] Emile F Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988), 147.

[41] Abdallah Frangi, *The PLO and Palestine* (London: Zed Books, 1983), 151; Sean K. Anderson and Stephen Sloan, *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 608.

[42] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 561–63.

[43] Ibid., 566.

[44] Ibid., 568.

[45] Ibid., 598.

[46] Miller, *The PLO and the Politics of Survival*, 126.

[47] Glenn Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 23.

[48] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 579–80; "The PNC," 152.

[49] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 598–99.

[50] Glenn Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution*, 23–25.

[51] Former DFLP Member B, interview by Author, 2010.

[52] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle*, 605.

[53] Ibid., 600–601.

[54] Ibid., 602–3.

[55] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1988" (U.S. Department Of State, 1989), 55–56, 58, 61, 63–64.

[56] "The Eighteenth PNC: An Analysis," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 16, no. 4 (1987): 152.

| | 15 Subordinates | fighters as compared to 800 for the PFLP and 500 for the DFLP, 300 for the PFLP-GC, 300 for the ANO, 300 for the PPSF, 50 for the PLF, and 50 for the PFLP-SC[58] |
|---|---|---|
| 1989 | H1: Fatah<br><br>15 Subordinates | Fatah had 7,000 fighters as compared to 800 for the PFLP and 500 for the DFLP[59] |
| 1990 | H1: Fatah<br><br>16 Subordinates | Fatah had 7,000 fighters as compared to 800 for the PFLP and 500 for the DFLP, 300 for the PPSF, 50 for the PLF[60] |
| 1991 | H1: Fatah<br><br>16 Subordinates | Fatah had 7,000 fighters as compared to 800 for the PFLP and 500 for the DFLP, less than 50 for PSF[61]; the PLO lost 80% of its annual funding due to support for Saddam Hussein in the Iraq war[62] |
| 1992 | H1: Fatah<br><br>16 Subordinates | Fatah had 7,000 fighters as compared to 800 for the PFLP and 500 for the DFLP, PSF has less than 300[63] |
| 1993 | H1: Fatah<br><br>16 Subordinates | In public opinion polling for elections, Fatah had 45% support, Hamas 13%, the PFLP 7%, PIJ 4%, FIDA 2%, Hizb Al-Sha'b 2%, DFLP 1%[64]; Fatah had 7,000 fighters as compared to 800 for the PFLP and 500 for the DFLP, PSF less than 300[65]; Fatah's budget was many times larger than that of the PLO[66] |
| 1994 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Hamas<br><br>14 Subordinates | Fatah had 7,000 fighters as compared to 800 in PFLP, less than 300 in PSF, and 50 in PLF[67]; In public opinion polling, Fatah had 34.9% support, Hamas 14.7%, the PFLP 8.4%, PIJ 3.8%, Hizb Al-Sha'b 2.5%, DFLP 1.9%[68] |
| 1995 | H1: Fatah<br><br>15 Subordinates | Fatah had 7,000 fighters as compared to 800 for the PFLP and 500 for the DFLP, less than 300 in PSF, 50 in PLF[69]; in public polling, Fatah had 49.5%, Hamas 14.4%, PFLP 3.6%, Islamic Jihad 3.4%[70] |
| 1996 | H1: Fatah<br><br>15 Subordinates | Fatah significantly weakens Hamas and cuts its funding[71]; 800 members for the PFLP, 500 for the DFLP, several hundred for the ANO and PFLP-GC, and at least 50 for the PLF[72]; In public polling, Fatah had 47.5% support, Hamas 6%, PFLP 2% , Islamic Jihad 1%, DFLP 1%[73] |
| 1997 | H1: Fatah<br><br>15 Subordinates | In public polling, Fatah had 45.8% support, Hamas 8.6%, PFLP 2.3%, Islamic Jihad 1.3%[74]; Tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers for Hamas, 800 members for the PFLP, 500 for the DFLP, several hundred for the ANO and PFLP-GC, and at least 50 for the PLF[75] |
| 1998 | H1: Fatah<br><br>15 Subordinates | In public polling, Fatah had 45.6% support, Hamas 9.1%, PFLP 2.3%, Islamic Jihad 2.4%[76]; Tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers for Hamas, 800 members for the PFLP, 500 for the DFLP, several hundred for the ANO and PFLP-GC, and at least 50 for the PLF[77] |
| 1999 | H1: Fatah<br><br>15 Subordinates | In public polling, Fatah had 40.2% support, Hamas 11.2%, PFLP 4.5%, Islamic Jihad 2.4%[78]; Hamas had tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers, 800 members for the PFLP, and several hundred for the ANO[79] |

[57] Augustus R Norton and Martin Harry Greenberg, *The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 199.

[58] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1988," 55–56, 58, 61, 63–64.

[59] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1989" (U.S. Department Of State, 1990), 58, 63.

[60] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1990" (National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City, 1991), 50, 64, 67–68.

[61] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1991" (U.S. Department Of State, 1992), 43, 60.

[62] Rone Tempest, "PLO Slashed Spending to Cope with Funds Cutoff," *Los Angeles Times*, March 30, 1991.

[63] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1992" (U.S. Department Of State, 1993), 30, 32, 47, 48.

[64] "CPRS Public Opinion Poll #2: Palestinian Elections" (Center for Palestine Research and Studies, October 1993).

[65] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1993" (U.S. Department Of State, 1994), 38, 42, 46, 57, 58.

[66] Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab- Israeli Conflict* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 420.

[67] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994" (U.S. Department Of State, 1995), 35, 55, 56.

[68] "CPSR Public Opinion Poll #5: Palestinian Political Attitudes Towards Elections and Other Issues of Concern" (Palestinian Center for Policy and Research, January 1994).

[69] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1995" (U.S. Department Of State, 1996), 59, 60, 61.

[70] "CPSR Public Opinion Poll #15: Armed Attacks, Negotiations, 'Separation', Election, Unemployment, and Palestinian-Jordanian Relations" (Palestinian Center for Policy and Research, February 1995).

[71] Mia Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (2004): 67–68.

[72] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996" (U.S. Department Of State, 1997), 53, 56, 57, 64, 65.

[73] "CPSR Public Opinion Poll #22: Armed Operations, Peace Process, Elections, Unemployment" (Palestinian Center for Policy and Research, March 1996).

[74] "CPSR Public Opinion Poll #26: Abu Ghnaim, Armed Attacks, Permanent Settlement, Peace Process, and Local Elections" (Palestinian Center for Policy and Research, March 1997).

[75] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997" (U.S. Department Of State, 1998), 72, 76–78, 90, 91.

[76] "CPSR Public Opinion Poll #32: Evaluation of the Performance of PLC and PA, the Status of Democracy, Corruption, Attitudes Toward Proposed Legislation on Weapons, Political Parties, and Public Assembly, the Peace Process, and the Iraqi Crisis" (Palestinian Center for Policy and Research, March 1998).

[77] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998" (U.S. Department Of State, 1999), 72, 76, 77, 85–87.

| 2000 | H1: Fatah<br>———————<br>15 Subordinates | In public opinion polling, Fatah had 36% support, Hamas 10%, Islamic Jihad 3%, PFLP 4%[80]; Fatah had tens of thousands of members, PFLP and Saiqa had 800 fighters, Hamas had 300 fighters, PIJ 350, Fatah-Intifada 700, PPSF 650, PFLP-GC 600, DFLP 500, ANO 400, ALF 350, PLF 350[81]; PFLP 800, several hundred for PFLP-GC, and several hundred for the ANO[82] |
|---|---|---|
| 2001-2016 | L1: Fatah<br>C2: Hamas<br>———————<br>14 Subordinates | In public opinion polling in 2001, Fatah had 29% support, Hamas 17%, Islamic Jihad 7%, PFLP 3%, DFLP 1%[83]; Hamas had tens of thousands of supporters[84]; Hamas's strength and public support remained within 1/3 of Fatah's (and generally much closer) for the next 15 years, and in 2006 Hamas closely defeated Fatah in legislative elections 44% to 41%[85]; although Hamas seized control of Gaza, Fatah maintained dominance in the West Bank and has polled above Hamas and maintained a larger budget every year since 2006[86] |

[78] "CPSR Public Opinion Poll #38: The Peace Process, Public Perception of PNA Performance, Corruption, Status of Palestinian Democracy and Elections for the PNA President and Political Affiliation" (Palestinian Center for Policy and Research, January 1999).

[79] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999" (U.S. Department Of State, 2000).

[80] "CPSR Public Opinion Poll #46: The Peace Process, the 'Petition of the Twenty,' PLC and PA Performance, Status of Democracy and Corruption, Elections for the President and Vice President, and Political Affiliation" (Palestinian Center for Policy and Research, January 2000).

[81] Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere* (Washington, D.C: Praeger, 2005), 166–67.

[82] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000" (U.S. Department Of State, 2001), 126, 129, 135.

[83] "PCPSR Public Opinion Poll #2: The Mitchell Report, Cease Fire, and Return to Negotiations; Intifada and Armed Confrontations; Chances for Reconciliation; And, Internal Palestinian Conditions" (Palestinian Center for Policy and Research, July 2001).

[84] "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001" (U.S. Department Of State, 2002), 87, 92, 103,104.

[85] "The Final Results for the Electoral Lists," Election Results (Central Elections Commission- Palestine, 2006).

[86] Jonathan Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 74. PCPSR Polls #7-55.