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The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform a Deceptive Debate

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The most striking aspect of the current scholarly debate over the political effectiveness of non-state violence is that, upon careful examination, there is not much of a debate to be found. Despite seemingly irreconcilable positions claiming that terrorism and insurgency "work" or "do not work," varying case selection and thresholds for success lie at the root of these debates, not disagreements over the empirical record. Although this previously unrecognized empirical consensus helps to resolve existing disputes, it relies on single-level strategic frameworks that fail to capture the effectiveness of violence from the perspective of those who employ it. This article presents an alternative concept of political effectiveness based on a two-level framework that accounts for the fact that insurgencies are not unitary actors, but are instead marked by armed groups that pursue strategic objectives that benefit their larger social movements (such as the overthrow of a regime or the withdrawal of enemy troops), while they simultaneously pursue organizational objectives that benefit the groups themselves (such as increasing membership or funding). Empirical analysis of eight paradigmatic

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campaigns common to studies of insurgency and terrorism across time and space reveals that the two-level framework better captures the political effectiveness of non-state violence than existing single-level models and primes the subfield for powerful new theories that explain greater variation in the use and effectiveness of non-state violence.

Does non-state violence work? The answer to this question has significant implications for states, social movements, and armed groups alike. When non-state violence succeeds, groups that employ it can help end military occupations, establish new states, and shift the balance of power among key political actors. When non-state violence fails, groups who use it can be weakened or even destroyed, and their affiliated social movements can suffer greatly as a result. Furthermore, whether successful or unsuccessful, groups' analyses of the effectiveness of past violence helps drive whether they will employ it in the future.

Although scholars have historically focused far more on states than non-state actors and on the causes of violence rather than its effects, a growing number of promising studies have begun to address the comparatively neglected subfield of the effectiveness of non-state violence. Scholars have waged fierce debates over whether non-state violence "works" or "does not work" based on overlapping analyses of hundreds of armed groups and their campaign outcomes across time and space.[1] An initial survey of the subfield suggests that a valuable consensus exists on the concept of the political effectiveness of non-state violence and the methods of assessing it, whereas scholars disagree significantly over empirical findings.

As this article will demonstrate, however, the opposite is true on all three counts. The seeming debate over whether non-state violence works or does not work is based on unacknowledged differences in case selection and thresholds for campaign success across studies, not actual disputes over the empirical record. In fact, scholars agree on the historical outcome of almost every violent campaign, thus revealing a surprising consensus on the central question in the subfield—at least as it is currently addressed—not a debate.

[1] Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005); Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006); Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008); Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *International Organization* 63, no. 1 (2009); Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

Unfortunately, this empirical consensus is limited in scope due to the narrow definition of effectiveness on which it is based. Scholars in the subfield purport to assess the political effectiveness of non-state violence relative to the objectives of those who employ it and talk in comprehensive terms about insurgency working or terrorism not working. They almost universally conceptualize effectiveness solely as the achievement of strategic goals, however, and so utilize unitary, single-level frameworks that ignore the organizational goals of group strength and survival that represent its most significant causes and effects.

This article presents a more robust, two-level theoretical framework for analyzing the political effectiveness of non-state violence. The two-level framework accounts for the fact that insurgencies are not unitary actors, but instead are marked by armed groups that pursue strategic objectives that benefit their larger social movements, such as the overthrow of a regime or the withdrawal of enemy troops, while they simultaneously pursue organizational objectives that benefit the groups themselves, such as increasing membership or funding.[2] Like politicians, armed groups may openly discuss their struggle to achieve the shared public good of national liberation, but their use of violence is driven as much by the pursuit of private benefits in the form of organizational survival and power.

A two-level framework best represents the political effectiveness of non-state violence, especially from the perspective of the actors employing it. Non-state violence does not simply affect the course of a military occupation, it also determines which non-state groups survive or perish, where each group falls in the hierarchy of its social movement, and, in some cases, which non-state group becomes the ruling regime of a new state. These organizational outcomes play a dominant role in solving the puzzles posed by existing scholarship: how armed groups perceive the success or failure of non-state violence, when such violence is likely to be strategically effective, and whether groups are likely to employ violence in the future.

Empirical analysis of eight paradigmatic campaigns common to studies of insurgency and terrorism across time and space reveals the significant advantages of a two-level framework and the problems of exclusive reliance on a single-level model. Previous single-level analyses offer a common interpretation of the outcome of these campaigns. They suggest that violence within each was employed for strategic ends, organizational success was

[2] Social movements are defined as "informal interaction networks between a plurality of individuals, groups, and/or organizations" with "a shared set of beliefs and a sense of belonging" that are "engaged in political and/or cultural conflicts, meant to promote or oppose social change." Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 14–15. Social movements often have numerous organizations within them (in addition to many individuals who are not part of any organized group); however, "A single organization, whatever its dominant traits, is not a social movement. Of course it may be part of one, but the two are not identical, as they reflect different organizational principles." Porta and Diani, *Social Movements*, 16.

irrelevant or omnipresent, and armed groups' perceptions of the effectiveness of violence mirrored that of the researchers. Analysis within a two-level framework suggests the opposite on all counts.

For example, the violent campaigns of both the Algerian and Zionist national movements are universally coded as successful. From the perspective of armed groups, this was not the case. The initially weak group that led the attacks in Algeria (the National Liberation Front or FLN) became the strongest actor in the country for three decades, while the group that led the violence among the Zionists found itself a minority party in Israel for the ensuing thirty years. Furthermore, the FLN's killing of more Algerians than French reveals that ending French rule was neither the only goal of the group, nor perhaps the dominant one.

Another example of the limitations of single-level analysis is evident in the contrast between Hezbollah's violent campaigns against international forces in Lebanon in the 1980s that are considered successes, and the violent campaigns by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) during the Troubles in Northern Ireland that are considered failures. In both cases, however, violence provided the groups with the power and support they needed to become the strongest political actors in their respective social movements. Finally, according to the single-level framework, armed groups that share the same strategic outcome should have the same perceptions regarding the political effectiveness of violence. In the Palestinian national movement, however, Fatah leaders, whose organization was weakened, considered the militarization of the Second Intifada a disaster and turned away from violence, while leaders of the surging Hamas praised the effectiveness of the same armed struggle and continued to utilize violence.

This analysis suggests that the two-level framework better explains the causes, effects, and perceptions of the political effectiveness of non-state violence than existing single-level models. Campaigns commonly considered to have identical or opposite outcomes concerning the political effectiveness of violence across or within movements are often more distinct or similar than is currently assumed, especially from the perspectives of the involved groups. In the process, the two-level framework enables more constructive conversation with related subfields on civil war, national movements, and spoilers that are increasingly driven by robust analyses of non-state violence employed by non-unitary actors at the organizational and strategic levels. This long overdue engagement will position the research program for more powerful theories and greater cumulative progress.

This article consists of four sections. The first section analyzes the current "debate that wasn't" over the effectiveness of non-state violence, as I demonstrate the unrecognized but significant theoretical and empirical consensus in the subfield. The second section presents a two-level framework for analyzing the political effectiveness of non-state violence that incorporates both organizational and strategic dimensions. The third section

compares empirical analysis by single-level and two-level frameworks across and within eight campaigns of non-state violence common to previous studies. The final section identifies the implications of these arguments and findings for scholarship and policy.

"THE DEBATE THAT WASN'T": IS NON-STATE VIOLENCE POLITICALLY EFFECTIVE?

Observers wading into the burgeoning literature on the political effectiveness of non-state violence cannot help but be struck by the strident tone and seemingly irreconcilable arguments of the most prominent studies to date. Soon after the 9/11 attacks and the publishing of a book entitled *Why Terrorism Works* by Alan Dershowitz, Robert Pape voiced an increasingly prominent argument in the subfield, "The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works."[3] Ehud Sprinzak, David Lake, Rohan Gunaratna, Andrew Kydd, and Barbara Walter, among others, support Pape's argument that terrorism works and point to government overreaction and terrorists' imposition of unacceptable costs as reasons for the political effectiveness of the tactic.[4] Andrew Mack, Ivan Arreguin-Toft, Jason Lyall, and Isaiah Wilson further argue that insurgency works, especially in the post-WWII era, due to a favorable balance of interests, strategic mismatch, and the mechanization of state militaries, respectively.[5]

Max Abrahms responded to this growing scholarly camp with a study entitled "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," which supported the prevailing position before 9/11 that was summed up by Thomas Schelling and Martha Crenshaw, respectively, "Terrorism has proved to be a remarkably ineffectual means to accomplishing anything," and "Few [terrorist] organizations actually attain the long-term ideological objectives they claim to seek, and therefore one must conclude that terrorism is objectively a failure."[6] These scholars

[3] Alan Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002); Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 350.

[4] Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*; Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," *Foreign Policy* no. 120 (September-October 2000); David Lake, "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century," *Dialog-IO* 1, no. 1 (January 2002); Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006).

[5] Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (January 1975); Ivan Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Lyall and Wilson, "Rage Against the Machines." Also see Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007); Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, "How Insurgencies End" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010); David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).

[6] Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work"; Thomas Schelling, "What Purposes Can 'International Terrorism' Serve?" in *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, eds., R.G. Frey and Christopher Morris (Cambridge:

have gained renewed support from subsequent studies of terrorism's ineffectiveness by Stathis Kalyvas, Audrey Kurth Cronin, Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, Page Fortna, and Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan.[7] Additionally, not all scholars agree that insurgency generally works, as Timothy Wickham-Crowley argues that fewer than ten percent of the insurgencies in his study were successful.[8]

Despite seemingly clear, irreconcilable claims, a deeper examination of these important studies reveals scholars talking past each other and failing to note their true similarities and differences. Once the debate over the political effectiveness of non-state violence is disaggregated into its constituent parts, this article argues that what scholars suggest is different is actually the same (their empirical analysis), what they suggest is the same is actually different (their methods of measurement), and what they truly have in common should be different, or at least diversified (their framework of political effectiveness). This analysis should strengthen the subfield's foundations by revealing the consensus on the variation in violent campaign outcomes, identifying the true areas of debate going forward, and laying the foundation for new theories that better explain this variation.

Robert Pape and Max Abrahms are two of the most prolific, cited authors on terrorism and its political effectiveness in the past decade.[9] In addition to their significant contributions to the discourse, their prominent studies provide an excellent example of "the debate that wasn't" that is symbolic of the larger subfield. Pape and Abrahms make perhaps the most contradictory claims in the subfield, with the former claiming terrorism "works" 50 percent

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Cambridge University Press, 1991), 21; Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 4 (December 1987): 15. This line of argument is also supported by Ted Robert Gurr, "Some Characteristics of Political Terrorism in the 1960s," in *The Politics of Terrorism*, ed. Michael Stohl (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1988). Eighty years ago, J. B. S. Hardman offered one of the earliest assessments of the effectiveness of terrorism: "As a complete revolutionary tactic terrorism has never attained real success. Governments, whether conservative or revolutionary, are not inclined to retreat before acts of terror directed against key persons." J. B. S. Hardman, "Terrorism," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. Edwin Seligman (New York: Macmillan Company, 1934), 579.

[7] Stathis Kalyvas, "The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War," *Journal of Ethics* 8, no. 1 (March 2004); Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*; Jones and Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End"; Page Fortna, "Terrorism, Civil War Outcomes, and Post-War Stability: Hypotheses and (Very) Preliminary Findings," in *American Political Science Association Annual Conference* (Boston, MA: 2008); Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*.

[8] Timothy Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). Also see Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[9] Max Abrahms has published a number of significant articles on the issue, including Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work"; Abrahms, "Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists," *Security Studies* 16, no. 2 (Spring 2007); Abrahms, "Are Terrorists Really Rational? The Palestinian Example," *Orbis* 48, no. 3 (Summer 2004); Abrahms, "Al Qaeda's Scorecard: A Progress Report on Al Qaeda's Objectives," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 5 (July-August 2006). Pape's work has served as Abrahms' main target of disagreement, because the central arguments in Pape's APSR article and subsequent book *Dying to Win* included the claims that suicide terrorism works and suicide terrorism spreads because groups have learned that it works. See Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism"; and Pape, *Dying to Win*.

of the time and the latter countering that it "does not work" because it succeeds only 7 percent of the time.[10] These diametrically opposed conclusions pose a hard test for any claim of consensus, yet their debate obscures actual agreement on the historical record and the unacknowledged existence of shared explanatory variables. Upon further examination, the gap between them disappears when differences in their standards of measurement and case selection are considered.

First and foremost, Pape and Abrahms do not disagree on what terrorism achieved (or failed to achieve) in any of their shared cases, even though this is the very essence of terrorism's effectiveness. Instead, they disagree over which achievements qualify as a success and which do not. In general, Pape sets a lower bar for success than does Abrahms by counting the achievement of small magnitude objectives as successes. As Pape argues, "Perhaps the most striking aspect of recent suicide terrorist campaigns is that they are associated with gains for the terrorists' political cause about half the time."[11] For Abrahms, "terrorism's effectiveness is measured by comparing their stated objectives to policy outcomes."[12] The use of different reference points—the pre-terrorism status quo for Pape and the ultimate objective for Abrahms—helps drive their disparate conclusions. For instance, a terrorist campaign that coerced the release of a prisoner would be coded a success for Pape because it was a new concession (as in the campaigns of Hamas and the Kurdistan Workers' Party), but would not be a success for Abrahms because it did not lead to significant progress in the group achieving a new state.[13] These differing standards of success account for the first part of the gap in their assessments of the effectiveness of terrorism.

Differing case selection accounts for the remaining discrepancy in their conclusions. Pape purports to study all campaigns of suicide terrorism, while Abrahms studies campaigns by all groups on the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list of the US Department of State.[14] Nonetheless, Abrahms includes four of the five groups in Pape's study—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)—and the two do not disagree on the outcomes of any of these campaigns. The

[10] Pape, *Dying to Win*, 64; Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 43.

[11] Pape, *Dying to Win*, 64.

[12] Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 48.

[13] Their focus on goals of differing magnitude is consistent across numerous cases. Abrahms assesses Hezbollah's ability to "destroy Israel" while Pape analyzes the group's ability to remove Israel from its security zone in southern Lebanon. For the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Abrahms assesses the group's ability to "establish communism in Turkey" while Pape analyzes the group's ability to release its jailed leader. For further discussion of how reference points in time shift perceptions of victory and defeat, see Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, *Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 191–98.

[14] Some of the problems in utilizing the FTO list have been documented, as in Max Abrahms et al., "What Makes Terrorists Tick," *International Security* 33, no. 4 (Spring 2009). Also see Audrey Kurth Cronin, "The "FTO List"; and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2003).

additional cases included in Abrahms' study, but absent from Pape's—such as campaigns by the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), the Abu Nidal Organization, and Revolutionary Nuclei—help to drive down the success rate in Abrahms' study, as they fail far more often than do their shared campaigns. The dispute is therefore not over what terrorism achieved in given campaigns—which is what most would consider the basis of the tactic's effectiveness—but rather which campaigns are included and whether what was achieved is enough to constitute "success." Therefore, although the debate between Pape and Abrahms initially appears to be one of empirics, it really is a dispute over methodology.[15]

Further assessment reveals that Pape and Abrahms not only agree on the outcomes of terrorism campaigns, but also potentially on key explanatory variables that neither acknowledges.[16] First, the previous analysis of their studies demonstrates the importance of objective magnitude in assessments of effectiveness.[17] The striking fact about Abrahms' additional groups is not simply that he measures their success against high magnitude objectives such as "establish Irish unification" (RIRA), "destroy Israel" (Abu Nidal), or "establish Marxism in Greece" (Revolutionary Nuclei), but that these groups are so small and weak, especially compared to those groups also included in Pape's study.[18] Analysis of Abrahms' and Pape's data yields initial evidence for the significance of strength as an explanatory variable, as the two scholars find similar success rates for campaigns conducted by groups with the same size membership (see Figure 1).[19]

Differences in case selection therefore help account for the differing conclusions concerning the effectiveness of terrorism because of Abrahms'

[15] It is worth noting that Pape and Abrahms could differ on whether terrorism works despite agreeing on all campaign outcomes, as they might disagree about the extent to which terrorism was the dominant factor in bringing about those outcomes. This is not the source of their disagreement, however, as these two authors, like the vast majority of their peers, assume that terrorism was a key factor in each campaign without empirically isolating its impact or employing process-tracing to capture it within each case.

[16] In a more recent article, Abrahms acknowledges the group strength critique but summarily dismisses it. See Max Abrahms, "The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited," *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 3 (March 2012).

[17] Campaign objective plays a significant role in setting the stakes for the encounter, as it determines the potential benefit for the coercer and cost for the target if the campaign is successful. In their work on economic sanctions, HSE argued, "The nature of the objective may be the most important political variable of all: sanctions cannot stop a military assault as easily as they can free a political prisoner." Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), 49.

[18] Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 49–50.

[19] These measurements represent the peak membership size of the groups. Further analysis is necessary to determine if the relationship between group strength and effectiveness is linear, monotonic, and/or involves thresholds, but it appears to be a potentially powerful explanatory variable. For the most part, scholars note that terrorists or insurgents are weaker than their state adversaries, but many treat this relative power imbalance as a constant that cannot explain variation in outcomes. Of course, even if all groups that employ terrorism or insurgency are weaker than their state adversaries, there are certainly stronger and weaker groups, both relative to each other and relative to states.



FIGURE 1 Campaign Success Rate by Group Size.

inclusion of a comparatively higher number of small groups (see Figure 2). In sum, differences in standards of measurement and case selection drive this supposed debate over the effectiveness of terrorism, rather than an actual dispute over the historical record. When one applies a common threshold for the effectiveness of terrorism to cases shared across studies, the debate disappears.

Many of the studies in the terrorism subfield do not include a representative sample of the universe of cases, which becomes clear when they are considered alongside the few studies that do attempt to capture all campaigns. Seth Jones and Martin Libicki analyzed 648 terrorist groups, yet their distribution of group size is quite different from that of Abrahms and especially that of Pape (see Figure 2).[20] Most groups in Jones and Libicki's study are quite small, with comparatively few reaching 1,000 or more members, yet groups of this size represent the vast majority in Pape's study.[21] Given the potential importance of group size to success, it is not surprising that Jones and Libicki find that groups that employ terrorism only achieve their objectives 10 percent of the time, which is far closer to Abrahms' figure of 7 percent than to Pape's 50 percent. To be fair, Pape and others would argue that suicide terrorism is qualitatively different from other forms of terrorism. In light of this data, however, it is worth asking whether the key difference is in the tactic itself or the strength and size of the groups who use it.[22]

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[20] Jones and Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End." Jones and Libicki used the RAND-MIPT (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) Terrorism Incident database to build their dataset of 648 groups.

[21] As Figure 2 demonstrates, the distribution of group size in Abrahms' study is similar to that of Jones and Libicki in every category except for the smallest groups, which makes sense given that such groups are unlikely to pose a threat to the United States and so rarely end up on the FTO list Abrahms utilized. As such, Jones and Libicki's study provides support for Abrahms' conclusion over its competitors.

[22] The same could be said for insurgency and terrorism. Differences in group size may contribute to the gap in success rates, as insurgency studies only include groups that have caused at least one hundred



FIGURE 2 Distribution of Group Size by Study.[23]

Analysis of the literature on the effectiveness of insurgency reveals the same illusory debate. Studies appear to clash over empirics, but in reality they differ in standards of success and case selection. In the most glaring example, Wickham-Crowley found that only 8 percent of the insurgencies in his study succeeded, as opposed to the 57 percent success rate suggested by Lyall and Wilson in their analysis of post-1900 insurgencies.[24] Further examination reveals that Wickham-Crowley holds that an insurgency was only successful if it achieved a social revolution—perhaps the highest bar of any study—whereas Lyall and Wilson code an insurgency as a success if the state simply withdraws militarily or even if there is a stalemate.[25] Lyall and Wilson's low bar for insurgent success helps explain disparities with other prominent studies. For instance, Chenoweth and Stephan find that violent campaigns succeed only 25 percent of the time, but the gap is due to the fact that they do not code draws as insurgent victories and they code ongoing

state deaths, but terrorism studies generally have no such thresholds, leading to the inclusion of many smaller, weaker groups. Michael Horowitz argues that suicide terrorism is not a unique phenomenon and that it can be explained as a tactical innovation driven by diffusion across networks of armed groups. Michael Horowitz, "Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism," *International Organization* 64, no. 1 (Winter 2010).

[23] Polynomial trend lines have been added to the graph to help provide a clearer visual of the different distributions of cases across the three studies.

[24] Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956*, 312; Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars." Lyall and Wilson analyze insurgencies from 1800 onwards, but I use their figures from 1900 onwards to create a more equitable comparison with Wickham-Crowley, and Chenoweth and Stephan, who exclude pre-1900 cases.

[25] As William Gamson noted, "There is a certain absurdity in comparing an organization that seeks a modest change and threatens no major redistribution of power with one that seeks to sweep aside the old order and all of its supporting institutions." William Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1975), 38. Toft also codes stalemates as wins for insurgency. Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, 110-112; Lyall and Wilson, "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," 71-72, 94.

campaigns as defeats, whereas Lyall and Wilson exclude them.[26] Simply coding stalemates as insurgent defeats shifts Lyall and Wilson's success rate to 36 percent for post-1900 insurgencies, which is identical to the figure suggested by Ben Connable and Libicki.[27] Yet again, standards of success and case selection account for the vast majority of variation in scholars' assessments of the effectiveness of violence. There are few, if any, empirical disagreements.

Both relative and absolute measures of success are worth utilizing, and both in-depth case studies and large-N cross-sectional analyses are needed to further develop our understanding of the political effectiveness of non-state violence.[28] The unrecognized methodological discrepancies presented here highlight the need for scholars to identify more clearly the true sources and scope of their debates, however, in order to facilitate cumulative progress. Nonetheless, the previous section reveals not only new areas of dispute, but also unrecognized agreement on the most fundamental aspect of any subfield: empirical variation in the phenomenon itself. To this point, scholars have been debating both *if* violent campaigns were successful as well as *when* and *why*. The recognition of near-universal agreement on the key empirical building blocks of the *if*—the strategic outcomes of campaigns of non-state violence—potentially enables the subfield to focus on building more powerful theories to explain the *when* and *why* of that variation.[29]

Unfortunately, existing scholarship is not yet primed to take full advantage of this situation, because the majority of studies of effectiveness employ a limiting theoretical framework that assumes a single, strategic dimension of interaction between violent non-state actor and state enemy.[30] If empirically there is an unrecognized consensus where there appeared to be a

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[26] Chenoweth and Stephan are a rare but welcome exception, as they explicitly note the methodological roots of their seemingly empirical disagreement. See Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 25–26, 60.

[27] Connable and Libicki further conclude that insurgencies succeed 54 percent of the time when mixed results are included, which is very close to Lyall and Wilson's figure of 57 percent with similar coding rules. Connable and Libicki, "How Insurgencies End," 30.

[28] Kathleen Cunningham's ground-breaking study implicitly raises the issue of absolute versus relative success. It is possible that national movements may receive small concessions from state enemies seeking to buy off parts of the movement, but these relative gains may help or hurt the movement's ability to secure its larger absolute goals (which is often the state's intention). Kathleen Cunningham, "Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?" *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 2 (May 2011).

[29] Further analysis of the accuracy of specific codings by regional experts would help to confirm the existing consensus.

[30] Unitary, strategic level models pose unresolved methodological problems for analysis. For instance, studies of the effectiveness of terrorism code single group-campaigns as the unit of analysis. The problem is that many conflicts involve multiple armed groups, so a single conflict could plausibly count as five or more wins or losses, skewing any overall assessment of the success rate. For instance, Abrahms' study includes seven armed groups whose objective is to "destroy Israel," which he counts as seven strategic failures for one common objective. This represents one-fifth of all of the failures in his study. See Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 49–50. Studies of the effectiveness of insurgency address this issue by coding the outcome of an entire insurgency as a single victory or defeat. However, this approach

contentious debate, conceptually there is a limiting consensus where debate and diversity are needed.

THEORIZING THE POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-STATE VIOLENCE: A TWO-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

Existing scholarship correctly identifies the central objectives of the subfield. First, capture the dependent variable: the political effectiveness of non-state violence from the perspective of those who use it.[31] Second, identify theories that explain the greatest variation in both the use and political effectiveness of non-state violence, including the link between the two.[32] Whether scholars of effectiveness focus on terrorism or insurgency, differ on case selection and a high or low bar for success, and (seemingly) disagree over the outcomes of campaigns, they almost all employ a framework that assumes a unitary non-state coercer employing force in pursuit of strategic concessions from a state enemy.[33] Unfortunately, this unitary, single-level framework prevents the subfield from fully achieving any of its main objectives, because it systematically disregards key causes, mechanisms, effects, and perceptions of non-state violence. A two-level framework that incorporates the organizational level better captures the dependent variable and provides a foundation for more powerful theories concerning the use and political effectiveness of non-state violence.[34]

obscures the fact that the effectiveness of violence is often quite different for each involved group (even those on the same 'side'), whereas these studies imply the opposite. The insurgency approach addresses collective movements, but not groups. The terrorism approach addresses groups, but not movements. Neither is reflective of reality nor, more importantly, entirely optimal for the construction of a general theory of political effectiveness.

[31] As Abrahms reminds us, scholars of the political effectiveness of non-state violence aim to mirror the perceptions of armed groups in their analysis and "define [objectives] as the terrorists do." Ibid., 47.

[32] "Terrorists, like other people, learn from experience. Since the main purpose of suicide terrorism is coercion, the learning that is likely to have the greatest impact on terrorists' future behavior is the lessons that they have drawn from past campaigns about the coercive effectiveness of suicide attack." Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 350.

[33] Of the twenty studies discussed in the previous section, all assessed the effectiveness of non-state violence in this manner. Another way to say this is that scholars may disagree at which point on the scale "success" begins, but they all use the same type of scale. On these issues, see Johnson and Tierney, *Failing to Win*, 23. With few exceptions, the near monopoly of unitary, strategic-level studies holds across the subfield of non-state violence effectiveness. Two notable exceptions include Mia Bloom's *Dying to Kill* for organizational effectiveness and Todd Sandler and John Scott's "Terrorist Success in Hostage-Taking Incidents: An Empirical Study" for tactical effectiveness. Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Todd Sandler and John L. Scott, "Terrorist Success in Hostage-Taking Incidents: An Empirical Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31, no. 1 (March 1987).

[34] For a debate that echoes this one concerning single-level or two-level conceptions of effectiveness for social movements, see William Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1990), 219–l68.

The Tactical, Organizational, and Strategic Effectiveness of Non-State Violence

What is effectiveness? Violence is effective to the extent that it achieves the objectives for which it was intended. The overall impact of violence includes all effects whether intended by an attacker or not, but effectiveness requires intent.[35] Studies of effectiveness must therefore first identify the key causes and effects of violence from the perspective of those employing it. These causes, effects, and perceptions are found within and across three levels of analysis—tactical, organizational, and strategic—which correspond to three units of analysis: the individual, group, and social movement, respectively. The political effectiveness of non-state violence is based on its ability to achieve organizational and strategic objectives, as they are both intended and politically significant goals whose effects extend beyond the individual attacker and physical target to include key political actors like the state and leading groups in the social movement (see Table 1).

At the tactical level of non-state violence, the objectives are to kill soldiers and civilians, destroy infrastructure, or exact revenge. Studies of the tactical effectiveness of non-state violence are essential, but they generally fall into the category of military effectiveness rather than political effectiveness.[36] Tactical objectives focus on the specifics of an operation, such as

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[35] Effectiveness only concerns intended objectives. The achievement of unintended objectives, even political ones, may be part of the overall impact of non-state violence, but it is different from the effectiveness of that violence, which involves intent. One of the most significant yet overlooked results of the 9/11 attacks was the weakening and ultimate demise of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), since revulsion at the attacks and subsequent government counterterrorist actions dried up popular and economic support for this organization, especially in the diaspora. Nonetheless, although the impact of 9/11 may have contributed significantly to this outcome, it is impossible to argue that these results were in any way intended by the al Qaeda attackers. Such achievements would therefore not count toward the attacks' effectiveness. Claude Berrebi and Esteban Klor's study of terrorism's impact on the Israeli electorate is one of the most methodologically sound studies of terrorism's effects; however, it is a study of terrorism's impact rather than its effectiveness. It is not clear from their article that shifting ruling Israeli coalitions toward the right is a desired end of attacking Palestinian organizations. Of course, their research provides an excellent basis for them or other scholars to analyze whether these results were linked to armed groups' strategies and their own assessments of success. Claude Berrebi and Esteban Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate," *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 3 (August 2008).

[36] Political effectiveness and military effectiveness are related but nonetheless distinct concepts. Although it may be difficult for an organization to successfully carry out a terrorist attack, exploding a bomb does not itself equal political effectiveness. Successfully launching an attack can be more accurately labeled "tactical effectiveness." For example, Todd Sandler and John Scott found that hijackers from 1968–84 were tactically ("logistically") successful at carrying out their operations 87 percent of the time, but only succeeded at receiving at least some of their demands 27 percent of the time. Sandler and Scott, "Terrorist Success in Hostage-Taking Incidents." Political and military effectiveness may correlate at times, as with the outcome of World War II, but at times they are at odds, such as with the 1973 Yom Kippur War that Israel won overwhelmingly on the battlefield but lost politically. In either case, military or tactical effectiveness may well be a necessary condition for the political effectiveness of violence, but it is not sufficient, and it is certainly not the same concept. Johnson and Tierney, *Failing to Win*, 11, 164–204.

TABLE 1 Levels of Analysis and The Two-Level Framework of Non-State Violence

Level of Analysis	Tactical	The Two-Level Framework for the Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence	
		Organizational	Strategic
Unit of Analysis	Individual	Organization	Social Movement
Primary Objective of Violence	Kill soldiers and civilians, destroy infrastructure	Private goods: Increase strength and security of the organization (increase recruits, funding, support)	Public goods: Increase strength and security of the social movement (end occupation, found a new state)
Primary Target of Influence	Same as the target of violence	Rival organizations and the shared popular base	The state and its popular base

how to detonate a bomb or escape detection. Furthermore, the objectives are focused on the individuals carrying out the attack and their physical target, and therefore do not directly involve the fate of the state or significant political groups who aim to wrest power from it.[37]

Strategic objectives—such as ending military occupation, altering the nature of the ruling government, or changing discriminatory policies—concern the struggle between a social movement and its state adversary, which represents the key audience for strategic violence. By making violent threats and detonating bombs to manipulate the costs and benefits of present and alternative policies in the eyes of government officials and their citizens, attackers hope to coerce the state to concede and take action it otherwise would not take. These concessions generally benefit the attackers' larger social movement, which includes all armed groups as well as their shared popular base. As such, strategic objectives resemble public goods, because the entire movement enjoys the benefits of foreign troop withdrawal, not just the attackers themselves.

If terrorist and insurgent attacks were launched entirely by unorganized individuals selflessly pursuing the common, strategic good, then organizational objectives would be nonexistent. History has proven otherwise, however, as the majority of such attacks and nearly all campaigns have been launched by self-interested organizations.[38] The fundamental purpose of any

[37] Most terrorism databases, such as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), can best be described as collections of tactical successes with few, if any, tactical failures. They also offer little to no coding on organizational and strategic effectiveness.

[38] A few isolated campaigns have been launched by individuals that actively chose to avoid the creation of an organization, but as David Rapoport notes, they were ultimately ineffective: "The Anarchists, of course, refused to establish permanent organizational structures on principle, certain that any structure would compromise their ultimate ideal. But they failed miserably." David Rapoport, "Preface to the

political organization—armed or unarmed, state or non-state—is to maximize its strength and ensure its survival.[39] Although armed groups may sacrifice individuals by deploying militants willing to kill themselves in attacks and may sacrifice strategic progress by violently spoiling negotiations, no armed group seeks to weaken or destroy itself.[40]

The key audiences for the use of violence at the organizational level are rival groups and the popular base inside the armed group's social movement. An armed group launches attacks to raise or maintain its profile as a fighting organization ready to bear sacrifices and willing and able to inflict pain on the enemy. The use of violence can help mobilize support for the organization from the base and allow it to outbid other armed groups in the movement for leadership. Additionally, an armed group can strike rival organizations directly to weaken them and improve its own position in the movement hierarchy. Unlike strategic goals, whose benefits are spread more broadly, organizational goals resemble private goods, as armed groups can effectively capture benefits like recruits and funding and deny them to non-members.

Moving from an Exclusive Strategic Focus to a Two-Level Framework

The strategic level of analysis is important in its own right and essential to any study of the political effectiveness of non-state violence. The problem with the twenty studies discussed in the previous section is that they aim to reflect

2nd Edition," in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed. David Rapoport (London: Frank Cass, 2001), xi. Mohammed Hafez notes, "Without organizations, aggrieved individuals cannot act out their violence in a sustained manner." Mohammed Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 25. Crenshaw asserts, "The organization may be more important than the individual to the initiation and conduct of campaigns of terrorism." Martha Crenshaw, "Questions to Be Answered, Research to Be Done, Knowledge to Be Applied," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 251.

[39] Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed. David Rapoport (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 19. Rather than assuming that armed groups employ violence in earnest attempts to achieve their stated, strategic objectives, scholars of the organizational approach trumpet Robert Michels and Max Weber's analysis on bureaucratization, noting the "predominance of organizational survival over the transformation of external reality." Donatella Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 84.

[40] Although studies of the organizational effectiveness of non-state violence may be in relatively short supply, those that analyze the importance of organizational motivations for carrying out attacks are not. See Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," *Orbis* 29, no. 3 (Fall 1985); Kent Layne Oots, "Organizational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups," *Terrorism* 12, no. 3 (1989). Roger Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Scott Atran, "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism," *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006); Fotini Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State*; Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2004).

the perspectives of the perpetrators of violence and offer the most powerful theories to explain variation in its use and strategic effectiveness, but they assume that the causes, mechanisms, effects, and perceptions required for these two tasks are all located at the strategic level. In reality, mechanisms at the organizational level are essential to explaining variation in strategic outcomes, organizational effects generate armed groups' overall perceptions of the effectiveness of violence, and these organizational perceptions drive the future use of violence. A two-level framework that includes both organizational and strategic levels is therefore necessary to achieve the main goals of the subfield, even if it were to remain entirely focused on strategic effectiveness.

First, most current scholarship on the effectiveness of non-state violence implies that armed groups prioritize strategic objectives without adequate theoretical or empirical justification for this claim.[41] If the claim were correct, armed groups would represent a massive anomaly in light of extensive research on collective action and the political-agent problem by Mancur Olson, Mark Lichbach, and Elizabeth Wood, among others.[42] In reality, scholars like Mia Bloom and Wendy Pearlman have clearly established that armed groups are as concerned with the internal organizational struggle for power as for their common strategic goals.[43]

Second, studies of the political effectiveness of non-state violence often ignore organizational objectives because they are supposedly insignificant or invariable.[44] The claim that organizational objectives are insignificant is similar to saying that to study the political effectiveness of the tactics of the

[41] Scholars often rely on the public pronouncements of armed groups, which consistently extol their own sacrifices for strategic objectives and the greater good. As Jon Elster reminds us, however, "There are certain arguments that simply cannot be stated publicly. In a political debate it is pragmatically impossible to argue that a given solution should be chosen just because it is good for oneself." Jon Elster, "The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory," in *Foundations of Social Choice Theory*, eds., Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 112.

[42] Mancur Olson notes that organizations can serve their members by creating public goods or capturing more of the existing resources in society. He argues they often end up doing the latter. Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 41–47. Also see Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Mark Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Elizabeth Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Gary Miller, "The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models," *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (2005).

[43] Bloom, *Dying to Kill*; Wendy Pearlman, "Spoiling inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process," *International Security* 33, no. 3 (Winter 2008/09).

[44] Some scholars refer to organizational objectives dismissively as "intermediate" or "process" goals, or claim that "all these [organizational] forms of success offer no insight into the effectiveness of the tactic in achieving its political ends." Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 47. Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, 77, 80. Abrahms notes, "There is little debate that terrorism often facilitates the achievement of intermediate objectives," echoing Crenshaw, who previously argued that "extremist organizations frequently achieve ... publicity and recognition." Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 47. Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," 15. In this case, Crenshaw is likely using "tactical" to denote the importance of the

Republican Party of the United States, it is not necessary to analyze how it grew from nothing to become one of the two significant political parties in the most powerful country in the world, or how it mobilizes tens of millions of supporters, raises billions of dollars, wins local and national elections, defines the debate on many key political issues, or prevents the realization of objectives by its major rival, the Democratic Party. Of course, it would be absurd to overlook such accomplishments, and scholars who wish to gauge the effectiveness of the Republicans and their actions certainly do no such thing.[45] For armed groups, becoming one of the dominant organizations representing a people, maintaining thousands of members, and gaining international recognition are all major accomplishments that shape the political landscape, especially when the very nature of an organization's actions means that much more powerful entities are actively working to prevent it from achieving these very goals.[46]

There is also significant, unexplained variation in the ability of armed groups to use violence effectively for organizational ends. The claim that organizational goals are easy to achieve stems in part from the empirically sound argument that non-state violence generally brings attention to an organization.[47] Organizational goals include far more than just notoriety, however, as strength and longevity require transforming that attention into significant popular and financial support. Suffice it to say, this is not an easy task and many organizations that employ terrorism or insurgency fail to achieve these key organizational objectives. As noted in Jones and Libicki's study, the majority of groups that employed terrorism consisted of fewer than 100 members, while others boasted more than 10,000 members.[48] Cronin removed

objective, rather than the military aspect. However, Crenshaw previously argued that "Any increase, however limited, in the terrorist organization's influence over the political process is meaningful," alluding to the fact that she supports inclusion of organizational objectives in studies of political effectiveness under certain circumstances. Martha Crenshaw, "Introduction," in *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University, 1983), 25.

[45] On the other hand, in their study of 648 terrorist groups, Jones and Libicki note that "in 10 percent of the cases, terrorist groups ended because their [strategic] goals were achieved," as if the 43 percent of groups that the pair found to have gained power by joining the political process did not achieve their (organizational) goals. Jones and Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida," xiv.

[46] Indeed, "No other strategy [than terrorism] invites harsher repression, greater moral censure, deeper alienation from the masses, or more potential for disaster." James DeNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 242.

[47] On this count, Schelling's argument is emblematic: "True, an intermediate means toward political objectives could be attracting attention and publicizing a grievance, and terrorism certainly attracts attention and publicizes grievances." Schelling further confirms his agreement with Abrahms, Cronin, and Crenshaw about the worth of such achievements with his next sentence: "But with a few exceptions it is hard to see that the attention and the publicity have been of much value except as ends in themselves." Schelling, "What Purposes Can 'International Terrorism' Serve?" 20.

[48] Many studies of insurgency implicitly recognize the significant variation in the organizational effectiveness of non-state violence, as they generally only include conflicts that involve one thousand battle deaths and at least one hundred casualties on both sides. Such a threshold implicitly acknowledges that many armed insurrections involve extensive violence, but because some do not reach this casualty

hundreds of organizations from the 873 in the original RAND-MIPT database before commencing her analysis because they did not display "sustained organizational capabilities."[49] Even the most successful and famous campaigns are marked by organizations who remain little known to this day because of a lack of public support and resources—the South Londonderry Protestant Volunteers, Ahrar Al-Jalil ("Freedom of the Galilee"), and the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students—whereas others, like the Provisional Irish Republican Army, Fatah, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are better recognized and have enjoyed greater support from people across the globe than many current states.[50] The considerable variation that exists in the ability of violence to achieve these intended, politically significant organizational objectives demands appreciation, analysis, and explanation, not indifference.

A skeptic might concede that organizational objectives cause non-state violence, vary in their achievement, and represent politically significant outcomes. Nonetheless, why is the organizational level of analysis necessary if

threshold, often due to organizational weakness or collapse, they are not included. As Connable and Libicki note: "We limited ourselves to insurgencies that passed a certain threshold; however, many protoinsurgencies die before reaching this threshold. Thus, while concluding, for instance, that most insurgencies that fought for independence succeeded, we omit all the protoinsurgencies that sought their country's independence but never achieved sufficient momentum to make the threshold for inclusion. This may constitute a form of sample bias that skews results." Connable and Libicki, "How Insurgencies End," 163.

[49] Cronin cited organizational failure as one of her six pathways to the demise of terrorist groups, but even her study underestimates the likelihood of organizational collapse. A brief examination of her data reveals that a failure to achieve organizational goals, rather than strategic choice, was responsible for the loss of most of these organizations from the dataset (and in most cases, the political scene). Over one-third of the 457 "durable organizations" Cronin subsequently analyzed lasted only 0–5 years, a proportion that would rise to well over half with the addition of the excluded cases. Furthermore, the original sample of 873 certainly fails to include many other organizations that have used terrorism briefly, but lacked a minimum of supporters, publicity, and standing for the RAND-MIPT researchers to find sufficient information about them. Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 207–208. Connable and Libicki also eliminated a significant number of cases (51 out of 127) from James Fearon and David Laitin's dataset for their study of insurgency, most of which also failed organizationally in short order: "Of the 51, almost half (25) did not see their second birthday, and all but nine of them ended within six years"; Connable and Libicki, "How Insurgencies End," 199; James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003).

[50] David Rapoport differs with scholars who claim that it is easy for armed groups to survive and thrive, arguing that 90 percent of organizations that use terrorism do not survive their first year. Although subsequent studies on longevity by Cronin, Jodi Vittori, and Jones and Libicki have tempered this claim a bit and stress the importance of group type for longevity, their studies do not refute the fact that 50 percent or more of the organizations that employ terrorism have historically measured their life spans in months, not years. David Rapoport, "Terrorism," in *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, eds., Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (London: Routledge, 1992). Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*; Jodi Vittori, "All Struggles Must End: The Longevity of Terrorist Groups," *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 3 (December 2009); Jones and Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End." Yet again, Crenshaw penned the best early work on the topic; Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1991).

the focus is solely on strategic effectiveness and how perpetrators perceive the utility of violence?

First, the best explanations for variation in the strategic effectiveness of non-state violence lie at the organizational level. Strategic-level studies have identified several key explanatory variables—including objective magnitude, target type, and the mechanization of the enemy state's military—but more powerful theories remain elusive due to these studies' assumption of a unitary non-state coercer operating solely at the strategic level. The enduring dominance of this framework in studies of the effectiveness of non-state violence is puzzling given that scholars have increasingly demonstrated the power of two-level analysis of non-unitary social movements and insurgencies for explaining when, why, and how competing armed groups use violence.[51] Campaigns are often marked by multiple armed groups whose number, institutionalization, and distribution of power are some of the most powerful variables for explaining variation in strategic effectiveness.[52] These organizational-level variables have been largely ignored in studies of effectiveness, but they are essential to the creation of improved theories.

Second, existing scholarship rightly seeks to capture perpetrators' perceptions of the effectiveness of violence, both as a key dependent variable for past violence and as a key explanatory variable for future violence.[53] Group perceptions of past effectiveness and future utility are based more on organizational outcomes than the strategic ones currently championed, however.[54] Therefore, it is not just that existing studies are incomplete or could achieve additional goals by adding analysis at the organizational level. Rather, they fail to achieve the two things they set out to do, and so make

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[51] Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); David Cunningham, "Veto Players and Civil War Duration," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 4 (October 2006); Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Ethan Bueno De Mesquita, "Terrorist Factions," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 4 (2008); Adria Lawrence, "Triggering Nationalist Violence: Competition and Conflict in Uprisings Against Colonial Rule," *International Security* 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010); Paul Staniland, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (February 2012).

[52] Cunningham, "Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?"; Wendy Pearlman, *Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Peter Krause, "The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: Paradox, Polarity, and the Pursuit of Power" (PhD Diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011).

[53] As Pape suggests, "The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works," thus making accurate assessment of group perceptions essential for those concerned with the causes of non-state violence. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 350.

[54] Crenshaw raised this issue decades ago, but scholars of effectiveness have yet to heed her call: "This perspective on terrorist behavior indicates that there may be a fundamental disparity between the outside world's perception of terrorists and their own self-perceptions. What the outside world perceives as 'failure' may not appear as such to the terrorist organization." Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," 487.



FIGURE 3 Two-Level Outcomes of Non-State Violence.

claims that are empirically inaccurate and offer theories with less explanatory power than they could because of their collective reliance on unitary, single-level frameworks.

The next section provides initial empirical evidence that the two-level framework better captures the causes, mechanisms, effects, and perceptions of non-state violence. The effectiveness of violence for these struggles at the strategic and organizational levels generates four basic types of campaign outcomes illustrated in Figure 3.

Essentially, when violence is good for a group, that represents an organizational success; when violence is good for the movement, that represents a strategic success, and vice versa. Armed groups in the same social movement share strategic outcomes, but they often will experience different organizational outcomes due to the inherent zero-sum nature of power struggles for movement leadership. This discrepancy allows for clear empirical tests of the relative weight of organizational and strategic effectiveness in forming group perceptions of the political effectiveness of violence. It is to empirical analysis comparing the two-level framework with its unitary, single-level competitor that we now turn.

COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: SINGLE-LEVEL VERSUS TWO-LEVEL FRAMEWORKS

Case Selection and Single-Level Analysis

The two-level framework offers a number of advantages over its single-level counterpart in theory, but comparative empirical analysis is necessary to determine which framework better analyzes the political effectiveness of non-state violence in practice. As discussed in the first section, existing single-level studies exhibit near-universal agreement in their empirical assessments

of the political effectiveness of non-state violence and associated armed group perceptions. This allows for a clear, comprehensive contrast with the two-level framework on ground already chosen by existing scholarship.

We will compare analysis by single-level and two-level frameworks of eight campaigns by national movements: the Irish national movement (1969–2001), the Algerian national movement (1954-62), the Zionist movement (1920–48), Lebanese resistance to foreign occupation in the 1980s, the Vietnam War (1955–75), the uprising of militant Islamists against the Mubarak regime in Egypt (1990s), and two campaigns of the Palestinian national movement—the struggle against Israel from within neighboring Arab states (1965-87), and the Second Intifada within the West Bank and Gaza (2000–2006). These campaigns are not obscure outliers, but rather represent foundational cases on which many previous studies of non-state violence are built.[55] They vary significantly across time and space, thus allowing for worthwhile comparisons both across and within campaigns. Finally, all eight campaigns emerge from national movements, thus holding constant the strategic goal: the removal of a foreign regime.[56]

How should we judge the relative merit of the competing frameworks? Yet again, we will provide single-level frameworks every possible advantage by employing their common standard: the superior framework will better capture the political effectiveness of non-state violence as intended, experienced, and perceived by those employing it. According to existing scholarship employing single-level frameworks, four of these campaigns had the same successful outcome in which non-state violence was effective: the Algerian national movement, the Zionist movement, the Vietnam War, and Lebanese resistance to foreign occupation.[57] Previous scholarship also agrees that the other four campaigns had the same unsuccessful outcome in which

[55] The main unit of analysis is the campaign, which is defined as a coordinated effort that involves one or more terrorist or insurgent attacks aimed at achieving a common political goal. Campaigns can be considered holistically, in that a forty-year campaign for national liberation is examined as a single case. Campaigns can also be split up into smaller units for the purposes of analyzing within-case variation in the effectiveness of violence. In this scenario, sustained breaks in the use of violence and shifts in geographic location can assist in dividing the larger struggle into micro-units, which allows the researcher to increase the number of observations in a constructive and systematic fashion. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). This approach has precedent in military analysis, as well as the study of economic sanctions. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009).

[56] The Islamic Group (*Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya*) in Egypt represents a partial exception. They did aim to overthrow the ruling regime and found a new Islamist Egypt, but they were not fighting against a foreign power directly, even though they correctly claimed that the Mubarak regime relied extensively on foreign support.

[57] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 237–38; Pape, *Dying to Win*, 40; Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 49–50; Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 82–85, 89. Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, "Correlates of Insurgency: Codebook and Replication Information," (2009), 21–22; Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 127–28.

non-state violence was ineffective: the Irish national movement during the Troubles, the uprising of militant Islamists against the Mubarak regime in Egypt, and the two campaigns of the Palestinian national movement.[58] In addition to sharing a common interpretation of the effectiveness of these campaigns, single-level analyses conclude that armed groups employed violence for strategic ends, that organizational motivations, mechanisms, and outcomes were nonexistent or irrelevant, and that armed groups' perceptions of the political effectiveness of violence mirrored that of the researchers.

Two-Level Analysis Across Campaigns: The Rise and Fall of Armed Groups

Analysis within a two-level framework suggests the opposite on all counts: (1) armed groups employed violence for organizational and strategic ends; (2) organizational motivations, mechanisms, and outcomes were omnipresent and critical; and (3) armed groups' perceptions of the political effectiveness of violence was driven as much or more by organizational outcomes as by strategic ones. First and foremost, I will employ the two-level framework to analyze the political effectiveness of non-state violence across the eight campaigns and the prominent groups that existing scholarship associates with them, revealing significant variation across what scholars consider to be similar outcomes. Second, I will employ the two-level framework to analyze the political effectiveness of non-state violence among multiple groups within three campaigns—the Zionist, Irish, and Palestinian national movements—revealing how differently violence can affect groups and their perceptions within the same movement.

Although the first four cases—the Algerian national movement, the Zionist movement, the Vietnam War, and Lebanese resistance to foreign occupation in the 1980s—may all represent strategic successes for the non-state actors, coding them as like campaigns in which violence worked is dangerously misleading. In reality, the effectiveness of violence for the organizations commonly associated by scholars with these campaigns was quite different.

On the one hand, the National Liberation Front in Algeria and Hezbollah in Lebanon used violence successfully to mobilize support and ultimately supplant rival factions to become the strongest groups within their movements. The FLN had in fact been a small splinter group that was far weaker initially than the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) and the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA), two factions that had led the Algerian national movement for many years before the FLN's emergence in 1954.[59] At the outset of the war, the FLN proclaimed, "We wish

[58] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, 237–38; Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 49–50; Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 110–11.

[59] The MTLD and UDMA had dominated local elections among Algerian nationalists before the war. In the 1947 municipal elections, the MTLD garnered 31 percent of the vote compared to 27 percent for the UDMA

to make it quite clear that we are completely independent of either of the two factions [the MTLD and the UDMA] which are struggling for power. According to true revolutionary principles, we place the interests of our nation above petty and misguided personal disputes or considerations of prestige. Our only enemy is the hostile and blind colonialism which has always rejected our demands for freedom, when presented by peaceful means."[60]

Although single-level models would accept the FLN claim to only hold strategic goals and avoid employing violence for organizational competition, the fact that the FLN was formed by splitting off from the MTLD and brutally sought to eliminate its rivals belies such proclamations. In mainland France, the FLN killed exponentially more Algerians than French. This was no accident. Over 10,000 attacks by Algerian groups, led by the FLN, killed 4,055 Algerian Muslims in France, compared to only 152 French civilians and 53 French police.[61] This disparity reveals that ending French rule was neither the only group goal for the use of violence nor, perhaps, the dominant one.[62]

Similarly, Hezbollah's use of violence for the purposes of mobilization and coercion allowed it to rise above rival groups like Amal and become the strongest military and political organization in Lebanon.[63] Collectively, these groups coerced the withdrawal of the French from Algeria and the multinational and Israeli forces from Lebanon. These campaigns therefore represent *total success* from the perspective of the FLN and Hezbollah, as each armed group successfully coerced concessions from the state as well as increasing its own position of power (see Figure 3).

among Muslim electors. Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 31; Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2006), 70. For the two best treatments of the use of violence in the Algerian national movement, see Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962*; Martha Crenshaw, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The* FLN *in Algeria, 1954–1962* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978).

[60] Arslan Humbaraci, *Algeria: A Revolution That Failed* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 47; Andre Mandouze, ed. *La Révolution Algérienne Par Les Textes* (Paris: Editions Maspero, 1961).

[61] Charles-Robert Ageron, "Les Français Devant La Guerre Civile Algérienne," in *La Guerre d'Algérie Et Les Français*, ed. Jean-Pierre Rioux (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 55. Benjamin Stora, *Ils Venaient d'Algérie: L'immigration Algérienne En France* (Paris: Fayard, 1992), 207-209. French sources suggest that the FLN killed twelve thousand Algerians in internal purges and seventy thousand Algerian civilians during the war, while the French lost only eighteen thousand soldiers and three thousand civilians to all combatants, FLN and otherwise. Even if many of the FLN's Algerian victims were Muslims fighting alongside the French, it is well documented that many thousands were members and supporters of rival nationalist groups. Anthony Toth, "The Generals' Putsch," in *Algeria: A Country Study*, ed. Helen Chapan Metz (Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994). Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*.

[62] As FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella later recounted, "We knew that in case of an uprising the French government would not hesitate to dissolve the MTLD and to imprison its leaders. This it did, to our great relief. The French helped us get rid of the *politicards* whom they suspected of being our accomplices, but who in reality greatly bothered us by the confusion they caused among the masses. The FLN, which the Organisation Spéciale had founded on November 1, became in this way, and thanks to our enemy, the only political force in Algeria." Robert Merle, *Ahmed Ben Bella*, 96–97 originally cited in William Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954–1968* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 94.

[63] See Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987).

On the other hand, the two remaining cases of success did not end so well for groups that helped lead the fight against military occupation. Although the Vietcong (also known as the National Liberation Front or NLF) played a dominant role in coercing US withdrawal from Vietnam, the armed group was significantly weakened in the process. The Vietcong-led Tet Offensive in 1968 was a key factor in causing US withdrawal, but the Vietcong failed to ignite a supportive popular uprising against the Thieu regime in South Vietnam and were themselves nearly destroyed in the fighting.[64] This use of violence severely weakened the strength of the group within the Vietnamese national movement, so much so that the Vietcong had little influence in the latter stages of the war or subsequent unification of the country. The North Vietnamese even prevented the Vietcong from participating in victory parades under the group's own flag.[65]

In the case of the Zionist movement, the Irgun (and its smaller offshoot, the Lehi) led attacks on the British from the late 1930s through 1948 that contributed to their withdrawal from the Palestinian Mandate. Nonetheless, unlike the FLN or Hezbollah, the Irgun's use of violence did not help it become the leader of its social movement. Instead, the Irgun was ultimately absorbed into the Israeli Defense Forces by its stronger rival, the Labor Zionist-led Haganah, and its affiliated political party won a small minority in the post-independence Israeli Knesset. Each of these two cases therefore represents a *selfless success,* meaning that although the Vietcong and Irgun's use of violence elicited concessions that benefited their larger movements, the groups themselves were weakened in the course of their campaigns (see Figure 3).[66]

If significant distinctions exist among the four cases thought to all be successes, the same is true for the four cases that existing scholarship holds

[64] The official Vietnamese history of the conflict from Hanoi's perspective notes that "During the first six months of 1969 our village and hamlet guerrilla forces suffered 15,000 casualties. Each local force company was down to only 20 to 30 fighters. . . . In 1969, we were only able to recruit 1,700 new soldiers in Region 5 (compared with 8,000 new recruits in 1968), and in the lowlands of Cochin China we recruited only 100 new soldiers (compared with 16,000 in 1968)." Hoang Co Quang Phan Dinh, Nguyen Duc Thong, Ho Huu Vinh, Nguyen Quoc Dung, and Hoang Phuong, *Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975*, trans., Merle Pribbenow (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 247. As for the Vietcong's perspective, one survivor recalled that "the Front's armed forces had suffered agonizing and irreplaceable losses during the frontal assaults of Tet." Truong Nhu Tang, *A Vietcong Memoir* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), 191-92.

[65] Tang, *A Vietcong Memoir*, 264–70.

[66] It is important to note that these labels of "selfless" and "selfish" refer to outcomes of campaigns, not intentions, and furthermore do not represent normative judgments. Most violent campaigns involve both selfless and selfish individual acts, and almost all armed groups can rightly be labeled selfish, in that few groups, if any, aim to weaken themselves. For example, Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir proclaimed on numerous occasions that the organizations they controlled, the Irgun and Lehi, respectively, cared only for the Zionist cause and not political power. Nonetheless, each of these men later became the prime minister of Israel at the head of political coalitions whose roots lay in their former armed factions.

to be those in which violence failed. Although the Palestinian and Irish national movements did not succeed in coercing the withdrawal of the Israelis and British from historic Palestine and Northern Ireland, respectively, key groups within each movement did successfully employ violence to benefit themselves and alter the structure of each movement for years to come.

In the Palestinian case, Fatah's attacks against the Israelis in the mid- to late 1960s caused a group that was far smaller and weaker than the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), and even the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP) to become more powerful within the Palestinian national movement than all of those groups put together.[67] The PLO and ANM initially protested against Fatah's strikes, claiming that they would hurt their common (strategic) cause by igniting a war when the Palestinians and their Arab allies were not yet ready.[68] Nonetheless, Fatah continued its attacks. The ANM and PLO eventually followed suit themselves, not after having been convinced that violence was strategically beneficial, but rather as they began to lose support and resources to Fatah due to its visible strikes against Israel. Although the campaigns of these armed groups to coerce Israeli withdrawal were unsuccessful, violence was the central factor in Fatah's rise to the top of the movement hierarchy, which later positioned it to negotiate with the Israelis, control the PLO and later the Palestinian Authority, and serve as the central Palestinian political actor for four decades.

In the Irish case, the use of violence by the Provisional Irish Republican Army allowed it and its political wing, Provisional Sinn Fein, to rise from a small splinter of the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) and Sinn Fein to a powerful actor that surpassed the OIRA, dominated the republican wing of the movement, and ultimately became the leading group in the Irish national movement. Each of these cases therefore represents a *selfish success* from the perspective of the PIRA and Fatah, meaning that although the social

[67] This shift was demonstrated by Fatah's takeover of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the supreme legislative body of the PLO, which came to include the vast majority of significant Palestinian factions. After initially holding just a handful of the PNC's original 422 seats in 1964, Fatah became the dominant group in the PNC by 1968, and saw its leader, Yasser Arafat, elected chair in 1969. Therefore, the PLO would continue to be influential in name, but its leadership and structure underwent significant transformation after being institutionally captured by Fatah. This power shift was due to Fatah's use of violence and subsequent increase in strength. See Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–993* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Fatah, *Kayf Tanfajir Al-Thawra Al-Musallaha, Wa Kayf Fajjarat 'Fatah' Al-Thawra Al-Filastiniyya (How the Armed Revolution Ignites, and How Fatah Detonated the Palestinian Revolution)*; Dirasat Wa Tajarib Thawriyya (Revolutionary Studies and Experiences); Ehud Yaari, *Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah* (New York: Sabra Books, 1970).

[68] Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993*, 108. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the ANM went further, initially suggesting that Fatah was tied to Israel in that its attacks hurt the Arab and Palestinian cause. Walter Laqueur, *The Road to Jerusalem: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), 56.

movements and their armed groups did not achieve their strategic aims, the campaigns strengthened these two groups (see Figure 3).[69]

Unlike the other two cases of strategic failure, the Islamist uprising in Egypt in the 1990s and the Second Intifada were also organizational defeats for the Islamic Group and Fatah. The Islamic Group (*Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya*) utterly failed to overthrow the Mubarak regime despite extensive violence employed against Egyptian security forces, foreign tourists, and Egyptian civilians. Furthermore, by the end of the campaign the Islamic Group was all but destroyed, with the vast majority of its members killed or imprisoned. Unlike during the 1960s and 1970s, Fatah's use of violence against Israeli civilians and soldiers during the Second Intifada was a disaster both for the movement and for the group itself. The attacks from 2000-2006 led to Israel taking further control of the West Bank, while Fatah's popularity and political clout decreased to the point that it shockingly lost the Palestinian elections of 2006 to Hamas, its major internal rival. Each of these campaigns therefore represents *total failure* from the perspective of the Islamic Group and Fatah, meaning that the social movements and the armed groups did not achieve their strategic aims, and the armed groups were themselves weakened as a result of their violent campaigns (see Figure 3).[70]

Two-Level Analysis Within Movements: The Importance of Organizational Effectiveness for Group Perceptions

These comparisons highlight underappreciated similarities and differences across movements, but what about the varying effectiveness of violence within movements? A snapshot of the impact of violence for a single group at a single point in time fails to capture the multiple factions that simultaneously fight against a common enemy and compete with each other within these movements over the course of one or more campaigns. Initial analysis of the Zionist, Irish, and Palestinian national movements reveals that although groups within the same movement may share strategic outcomes, the organizational effectiveness of violence is often quite different from one group to the next. This leads to widely varying assessments of whether violence was politically effective from the perspectives of groups, even among those on the same side of the larger conflict. This claim cuts directly against the conclusions of existing single-level studies.

Unlike the aforementioned Algerian, Lebanese, and Irish cases, where the weaker groups that initiated the violence rose to the top, the opposite was true in the Zionist movement. The group that consistently attempted to

[69] Again, "selfish" refers to outcome, not intent, and is not a normative label.

[70] Many little known armed groups that never find their way into scholarly studies, due to their inability to survive and conduct extensive coercive campaigns, also populate this box.

constrain violence won out (the Haganah), while those who initiated conflict time and again remained in the minority politically (the Irgun and Lehi). The Haganah was the largest and strongest armed Zionist organization within the Palestinian Mandate from its founding in 1920 onwards, and it was controlled by the Labor party (Mapai). Throughout most of its existence, the Haganah practiced a policy of *havlagah* (restraint), which called for no attacks or reprisals against Arabs or occupying British forces.[71] Zionists frustrated with *havlagah* split off from the Haganah and formed the Irgun Zvai Leumi in 1931. The Irgun's symbol—a hand grasping a rifle over a map of the entire Palestinian Mandate with the words "Only Thus"—communicated the Irgun's objective and strategy: the only way to achieve the Zionist goal of a Jewish state was through force.

The Irgun's first major spate of attacks came amidst the Arab Revolt of 1936-39, as the group killed and wounded hundreds, including many civilians, when it bombed bus stations and marketplaces in attempts to punish Arabs for their own attacks and deter future ones.[72] In response to the Irgun attacks, the Jewish Agency (which was dominated by Mapai and controlled the Haganah) issued proclamations in June of 1939 signed by hundreds of Zionist leaders, which stated, "Let the Yishuv unite to defend the national homeland from the terrorists from within, as from the enemies from without." These proclamations also claimed that the Irgun aimed "not to fight the Mandatory power but to weaken the Yishuv . . . to take over its control."[73] Irgun attacks on the British during the latter stages of World War II brought direct confrontation with the Haganah, which assisted the British in repressing the organization during the "Hunting Season."[74]

Although the Haganah itself launched attacks against the British from 1945–46 alongside the Irgun, the latter continued to bear the brunt of imprisonment and death at the hands of the British, while the Haganah returned to a policy of restraint in 1946. The Haganah and its Mapai supporters denounced the methods of their rivals, but the Irgun's use of violence contributed significantly to the movement's strategic success. In particular, the hanging of two

[71] This policy complemented the attempts of the Zionist Organization and Mapai to curry favor with the British, which had yielded the British Balfour Declaration in support of a Jewish homeland in 1917, as well as subsequent facilitation of Jewish land purchase and immigration.

[72] On 11 November 1937, the Irgun killed two Palestinians and wounded five near a bus station in Jerusalem. On 6 July 1938, Irgun members dressed as Arabs placed bombs in the Palestinian market of Haifa, killing twenty-one and wounding fifty-two. Another bomb in the same market on 25 July killed at least thirty-nine Palestinians and wounded at least seventy. Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 147.

[73] The Yishuv is the Jewish community that lived in Palestine before the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Yitshaq Ben-Ami, *Years of Wrath, Days of Glory: Memoirs from the Irgun* (New York: Shengold Publishers, 1983), 232-33.

[74] During this period, the Haganah and its Mapai backers fired Revisionist Zionists from their jobs, tipped off British authorities to the whereabouts of Irgun fighters, and even arrested many of the Irgun members themselves.

British sergeants by the Irgun in 1947 shocked British public opinion and helped coerce British withdrawal by raising the costs of continued occupation.[75] Nonetheless, due in part to a lack of popularity for such attacks among the Jewish base, the Irgun and their Revisionist allies remained on the sidelines politically. The Irgun was absorbed into the Israeli Defense Forces (the new name for the Haganah starting in May 1948). Its affiliated political party (Herut) won only 11.5 percent of the vote in the post-independence Israeli Knesset, which was dominated by the Haganah-allied Labor parties (Mapai received 35.7 percent of the vote and Mapam 14.7 percent) and would remain so for three decades. The Zionist campaign therefore represents a *total success* for the Haganah, but a *selfless success* for the Irgun.

Violence during the Irish national movement met with perhaps the most mixed record of effectiveness across groups. The Easter Rising and War of Independence (1916–22) yielded a *total success* for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Sinn Fein (SF), as the groups wrested control of the movement away from its longtime leader, the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), and violently coerced British withdrawal from three-quarters of Ireland. The subsequent English Campaign of 1939, the Northern Campaign of 1942–44, and the Border Campaign of 1956–62 represented *total failures*, however, as the IRA and SF were unable to gain concessions from the British in Northern Ireland or unseat the IPP-successor there, the Nationalist Party, which dominated nationalist politics and foreswore violence.[76] The longest violent campaign, the Troubles of 1969–98, saw the greatest variation in effectiveness of all.

After the failures of the Border Campaign, the IRA began to move away from the use of force in a bid to push nonviolently for Catholic civil rights in the North.[77] However, when the IRA failed to sufficiently protect Catholic communities from growing clashes with police and Protestant civilians in

[75] Many historians argue that the hanging of two British officers by the Irgun in 1947 was the single most important action that caused British withdrawal from the Palestine Mandate. As historian Michael Cohen claimed, "There is no doubt that the hanging of the sergeants was the most influential event in the period of the Jewish struggle against the Mandate. Despite the meager resources at the disposal of Etzel [Irgun] and Lehi by comparison to the Haganah, it was their extremist actions that made a great impression in Britain. Along with other factors, they were instrumental in Britain's retreat from the Mandate." Uri Milstein, *History of the War of Independence: A Nation Girds for War*, vol. 1, trans., Alan Sacks, (New York: University Press of America, 1996), 93–94.

[76] The Irish national movement has a long history of split leadership, often coalescing into two broad wings known as nationalists and republicans, each of which generally contained multiple groups. Despite some differences in tactics and ideology, groups from the two wings shared a common objective of greater Irish independence, a common base of supporters that often moved between them, and common enemies like the British and Irish Unionists. Brendan Lynn, *Holding the Ground: The Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland, 1945–1972* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1997).

[77] As part of the IRA's increased push for worker's rights, the group worked in part under the umbrella of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), which pushed to reform formal and informal housing, employment, and voting policies that disadvantaged Catholics and the working class. J. Bowyer Bell, *The Secret Army: A History of the IRA 1916–1979* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980), 357.

1969, a quarter of the group split off to form the Provisional Irish Republican Army and Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF). As Gerald Murray and Jonathan Tonge note, "At first the Provisionals were dwarfed by the Official IRA and there were sufficient members and new recruits for only one battalion in the [Belfast] Brigade area."[78] Over the course of the next decade and a half, however, the PIRA's extensive use of force against the British and Protestant factions inspired surges in recruitment, funding, and popularity. The Provos were increasingly perceived as the group with the will and capability to protect Catholics and pursue the goal of British withdrawal from Northern Ireland.[79]

The PIRA's organizational success was such that the OIRA was pressured to employ force in an attempt to maintain its leading organizational position, rather than for strategic ends. As one former OIRA man claimed, "The Sticks [OIRA] supplied s*** to the North, except when the Provos got out of hand."[80] The fact that the OIRA leadership did not send sufficient weapons to field units, unless the PIRA threatened, led Jack Holland and Henry McDonald to argue that "the Official IRA volunteers who were troubled by the ceasefire began to have even more serious doubts about just who it was their leaders were expecting them to oppose—the Provos or the British."[81] Unfortunately for the OIRA, early recognition of the dangers of violent competition did little to stop it: "In mid-1971 [OIRA Adjutant-General Sean] Garland warned the movement against allowing itself to be swept up by the gathering momentum of PIRA's violence: 'Unfortunately, because of our history as a movement committed to force, we are liable to be brought down along with these elements.'"[82] Although the OIRA was able to maintain its position as a significant faction in the movement for many years, it eventually lost strength due to violent

[78] Ed Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 48.

[79] A strong majority of both IRA and Sinn Fein members initially stayed with the Officials, demonstrating that the ideology of the PIRA certainly was not more popular. Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 175. One could even go as far as J. Bowyer Bell and argue that their ideology remained quite similar: "Neither IRA had foresworn physical force, neither had denied the need for revolutionary reform, neither failed to identify Britain as the major enemy, both continued despite the evidence to place hope in the Ulster Protestant working class." In either case, it is clear that the PIRA's ideology was either unimportant or detrimental to their early struggle with the Officials, not a boon. What did differ between the groups was the quality and quantity of their use of violence. Bell, *The Secret Army*, 372.

[80] "Stick" is a somewhat derogatory term that refers to the OIRA and OIRA members. The term originates with the Easter Rising commemorations, for which republicans often wear Easter lilies. Starting in 1967, Sinn Fein and IRA members started wearing lilies with self-adhesive, sticky backing. After the split, the PIRA returned to the more traditional pinned lilies, and referred to OIRA members as Sticks. Jack Holland and Henry McDonald, *INLA: Deadly Divisions* (Dublin: Torc, 1994), 6.

[81] Ibid., 20.

[82] The OIRA later reaffirmed its desire to avoid such violence: "It has never been, and it is not now our intention to launch a purely military campaign against British forces in the North. We have seen the failures of past campaigns based on military action only and have set our faces against such campaigns which are doomed to failure." M. L. R. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement* (London: Routledge, 1995), 88.

missteps and internal splits, including the loss of many members to the rival Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), formed in 1974.

By the early 1980s, the PIRA became the dominant faction within the republican wing of the Irish national movement, which positioned the group to eventually negotiate and sign the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, cementing its prominent position in the hierarchy.[83] Splinter groups like the Real Irish Republican Army and Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) tried and failed to violently spoil the power-sharing agreement and weaken the PIRA. By 2001, the Provos even overtook their longtime nationalist rivals and cosignatories to the Good Friday Agreement, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which had been the most powerful political force within the movement in Northern Ireland throughout the Troubles.[84]

The Troubles involved great variation in the effectiveness of violence, as force was organizationally effective for the PIRA, somewhat effective for the OIRA, and ineffective for the INLA, RIRA, and CIRA. Although there is little disagreement about what happened historically at the conclusion of the Troubles, participants disagree over whether these events constitute a success or failure. It is interesting to note that group perceptions of the overall effectiveness of the campaign correlate strongly with their own disparate organizational outcome, rather than their common strategic one. Weak groups who were unable to create strong organizations like the RIRA and CIRA castigate the Good Friday Agreement as a failure, whereas those who rose to power within the movement, such as the PIRA, generally highlight its successes, even though the PIRA previously criticized the similar Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 from which it was excluded.[85] This suggests that organizational success may drive group perceptions of the overall effectiveness of violence and perhaps also its strategic effectiveness, rather than the other way around.

[83] The Good Friday Agreement was based on the concept of power sharing between Britain, Ireland, and nationalist and unionist factions in Northern Ireland. Under the terms of the agreement, Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom, but increasing ties to Ireland were institutionalized. The agreement meant that the Protestant-dominated unionists were likely to continue to control Northern Ireland for the foreseeable future, but Catholic-led nationalists received greater representation and rights.

[84] The SDLP was founded in 1970. A successor to the Nationalist Party, the SDLP was the leader of the nationalist wing of the movement, as well as the strongest political party in the Irish national movement in Northern Ireland from 1970–98. Three years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, Provisional Sinn Fein won 21 percent of the vote versus 19 percent for the SDLP in the 2001 district elections in Northern Ireland, topping its rival for the first time. Nicholas Whyte, "The 2001 Local Government Elections in Northern Ireland," (Economic and Social Research Council, Northern Ireland, 2001). Also see Sean Farren, *The SDLP: The Struggle for Agreement in Northern Ireland, 1970–2000* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2010).

[85] It is worth noting that the popular base of the nationalist movement in Northern Ireland—the population that stood to benefit or lose as a result of strategic gains or losses—agreed with their unionist counterparts that the Good Friday Agreement was a success for nationalists that disproportionately benefited them. Tony Fahey, Bernadette C. Hayes, and Richard Sinnott, *Conflict and Consensus: A Study of Values and Attitudes in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2005), 104–13.

Overall, the Irish Republican Army and its successors experienced a *total success* in the War of Independence, *total failures* in the English Campaign, Northern Campaign, and Border Campaign, and, depending on which group's perspective matters, a *total success* (the PIRA's view of themselves), *selfish success* (the RIRA and CIRA's view of the PIRA), or *total failure* (the RIRA and CIRA's view of themselves) in the Troubles. This reveals far greater variation than can be captured by a single-level conception of effectiveness, and carries significant implications for the study of non-state violence and the use of future violence.

In the Palestinian case, the importance of organizational objectives for causing violence and driving perceptions of its effectiveness is further cemented. In the Second Intifada, the use of violence by Palestinian groups led to shared major strategic defeats amidst smaller strategic victories, but mixed organizational outcomes across groups.[86] The Second Intifada helped to spoil negotiations with the Israelis and led to the destruction of Palestinian Authority institutions, an increased Israeli presence in the West Bank, an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and the loss of international support. Furthermore, the campaign led to a rise in Hamas's organizational strength relative to Fatah, culminating in the former's 2006 electoral victory.

How do Palestinian groups perceive the effectiveness of violence in this campaign, which had a common strategic outcome but disparate organizational outcomes? Their perceptions diverge in line with their organizational fortunes. Hamas perceives the use of violence in the Second Intifada as a major success.[87] On the other hand, Fatah leaders perceive the militarization of the Second Intifada as a disaster, even though the movement collectively experienced the same strategic gains and losses.[88] What is more, this case

[86] The situation for Fatah was reversed four decades after its own rise. Fatah saw its weaker rival, Hamas, successfully use violence for organizational ends: to spoil negotiations with the Israelis and gain popular support. Fatah's attempts to respond with suicide bombings of its own neither coerced Israeli concessions nor prevented Hamas' rise at Fatah's expense. For the best analysis of the causes and effects of suicide bombing during the Second Intifada, see Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism*. For excellent analysis of the shifting targets and audiences for violence within the Palestinian national movement, see Ian Lustick, "Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Targets and Audiences," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

[87] Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar voiced the common refrain echoed by Khaled Meshaal, Ismail Haniyeh, and the rest of the Hamas leadership concerning the Second Intifada: "Very simply, nobody can deny that if Israel is going to leave the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank, that was because of the intifada, because of the armed struggle, because of the big sacrifices of Hamas for this goal. It was not because of negotiations, or the goodwill of Israel, or the Americans or Europeans." Stephen Farrell, "Hamas Militant Adds Ballot Box to Armoury," *Times*, 14 April 2005. As for the Palestinian people who are supposedly the main beneficiaries of strategic gains? 84 percent agreed with Hamas that armed struggle had yielded the victory of the Gaza withdrawal. Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. 17," (Ramallah: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2005).

[88] Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas has been consistent and strident in his condemnation of the militarization of the Second Intifada and made that a central part of his political platform. Former Fatah leader Mahmoud Dahlan concurred. See Ghassan Sharbil, "Controversial Fatah Player Opens His Books to 'Al-Hayat' and Opens Fire," *Al-Hayat*, 3 September 2008.

suggests that existing scholarship is correct that group perceptions of the past effectiveness of violence help drive future behavior. Hamas has continued to employ violence in the years after the Second Intifada, whereas Fatah has opted for negotiations and other non-violent tactics. Nonetheless, organizational outcomes seem to play the dominant role in group perceptions of political effectiveness and future actions, rather than the researcher-coded strategic outcomes previously proposed.

THE POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-STATE VIOLENCE: SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

Does non-state violence work? The analysis in this article demonstrates that existing frameworks, theories, and empirical analyses employed to answer this question are inadequate. Once the current debate over the political effectiveness of non-state violence is disaggregated into its constituent parts, this article argues that what scholars suggest is different is actually the same (their empirical analysis), what they suggest is the same is actually different (their methods of measurement), and what they truly have in common should be different, or a least diversified (their framework of political effectiveness).[89] Existing scholarship largely agrees that the political effectiveness of non-state violence should be assessed with a single-level, strategic framework. Unfortunately, such analysis fails to sufficiently capture the causes, mechanisms, and effects of non-state violence, as well as the perceptions of those who employ it.

The two-level framework presented in this study holds that armed groups pursue strategic objectives that benefit their larger social movements while they simultaneously pursue organizational objectives that benefit the groups themselves. Rather than single groups acting in isolation, the two-level framework accommodates campaigns of non-state violence that often involve numerous armed groups embedded in larger, non-unitary social movements. Contrary to single-level strategic frameworks, the two-level framework suggests that concerns of group survival and empowerment drive the use of violence and perceptions of its effectiveness, which are often different across groups within the same movement due to the varying organizational effects of violence.

Empirical analysis indicates that the two-level framework better captures the political effectiveness of non-state violence than existing single-level models. This analysis demonstrates that cases previously thought to

[89] The first section of this article exhibits some similarities in spirit and purpose to an excellent earlier work that analyzed the concepts, methods, and conclusions concerning the effectiveness of economic sanctions. See David Baldwin, "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," *International Security* 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999/2000).

be equivalent instead present significant variation in the political effectiveness of non-state violence that must be appreciated and explained. The world would have been quite a different place if the Irgun and the Revisionists had ruled Israel for its first three decades of existence, if violence had propelled Fatah to extinction rather than predominance, or if the Islamic Group had violently overthrown Mubarak in 1995 as opposed to the massive coalition that did so peacefully in 2011. Furthermore, an appreciation for organizational objectives indicates that cases previously treated as polar opposites may contain as many similarities as differences concerning the political effectiveness of non-state violence. Campaigns of the Provisional IRA, the FLN, Hezbollah, and Fatah (from 1965-87) saw violence strengthen their organizations, even though their campaigns may be perceived as opposites on purely strategic grounds. Likewise, despite variation in strategic success, the Vietcong, Islamic Group, Irgun, and Fatah (during the Second Intifada) all experienced firsthand the organizationally destructive nature of violence.

Furthermore, evidence suggests that the organizational objectives at the heart of the two-level framework play the dominant role in group motivations for violence and perceptions of its political effectiveness, rather than the strategic objectives on which existing scholarship relies. Scholarly attempts to predict the likelihood of future violence based on group perceptions of past strategic effectiveness alone are likely to fail, as the recent Palestinian case demonstrates. Single-level, strategic frameworks still have value for certain tasks, but they are less able to identify the causes, mechanisms, outcomes, and perceptions of the political effectiveness of non-state violence than previously thought. Therefore, although the first section of this article revealed an existing empirical consensus despite a seeming debate, the final two sections demonstrated the problems with that consensus and the superiority of the two-level framework for empirical analysis and theory construction.

The analysis in this study leads to four significant implications. First, existing scholarship poses a puzzle. In light of a growing consensus that non-state violence is often strategically ineffective, both in its own right and compared to other tactics, why do non-state groups continue to use force if it is likely to fail? Are groups that employ terrorism and insurgency irrational, relying on means that have little hope of achieving their ends? The analysis here implies that group perspectives on the effectiveness of violence are not limited to strategic outcomes, and that they in fact prioritize the organizational impact of force on their own power and position. Therefore, the real puzzle is not the irrational behavior of armed groups, but rather the puzzling decision by many scholars to assume that groups prioritize the achievement of collective, strategic objectives whose benefits are diffuse yet whose costs are often concentrated. Regardless of its strategic value, armed struggle will remain an attractive option for non-state groups so long as it carries with it the promise of organizational gains.

Second, it is impossible for scholars and policymakers alike to develop a solid understanding of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency without fully grasping the objectives and effectiveness of terrorism and insurgency. This analysis therefore raises a key question: What exactly are the objectives of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency? Much ink has been spilt on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency of late, but scholars and practitioners have focused on the strategies linking means and ends—a "hearts and minds" approach versus repression, discriminate versus indiscriminate tactics, a crime model versus a war model—rather than the ends themselves, which are paid comparatively little attention. As with terrorism and insurgency, state efforts can be best understood as tactical (stopping attacks), organizational (degrading armed groups), and strategic (preventing the achievement of movement goals). Scholars and practitioners of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency would benefit from greater clarity in their objectives along these lines, especially given their limited resources. A failure to identify priorities among these objective types, both within armed groups and the state itself, is at the root of many failed counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns.[90]

Third, this study lays the foundation for new theories that utilize the organizational level of analysis to explain greater variation in the strategic effectiveness of non-state violence and the use of violence by armed groups. Groups may use violence to pursue both organizational and strategic ends, but the link between the two is not well understood. Is the achievement of one necessary for the achievement of the other? Are organizational and strategic goals complementary or contradictory, and under what conditions? How much influence do perceptions of past organizational effectiveness have on group decisions to employ violence in the future? This article provided a theoretical framework and some initial evidence, but a deeper examination of the relationship between different types of effectiveness is necessary to identify causal mechanisms across levels and create new theories that offer a more comprehensive explanation for when, why, and how non-state violence is organizationally, strategically, and politically effective.

[90] One can see elements of all three objective types in US counterterrorism campaigns. First, there is the "War on Terror," which is aimed at stopping the tactic, at least against the United States. Second, organizations that employ terrorism against the United States and its allies often find themselves on the US State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, leading to a variety of economic, political, and military actions against their groups. Finally, policymakers commonly cite the pursuit of stable democracies unfriendly to US enemies as a central objective of campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. It is debatable (and should be publically debated) the extent to which these tactical, organizational, and strategic objectives complement or contradict each other, and whether the United States can or should attempt to achieve all three. In any case, scholars should be clear about the assumed objectives of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in their analyses. For analysis of a prominent failure driven in part by ill-defined means and ends, see Peter Krause, "The Last Good Chance: A Reassessment of U.S. Operations at Tora Bora," *Security Studies* 17, no. 4 (October 2008).

Finally, utilizing a two-level framework to analyze the political effectiveness of non-state violence will create powerful synergies with closely related subfields and position the research program for greater cumulative progress. There may be few examples of two-level, non-unitary analyses of the political effectiveness of non-state violence, but the same is not true of studies of the causes and mechanisms of non-state violence. There are a growing number of excellent studies that analyze the role of violence amidst internal struggles of non-unitary social movements.[91] Utilizing the two-level framework for the political effectiveness of non-state violence would allow scholars to connect to existing theories and analyses of internal contention, mobilization, and the causes and strategies of non-state violence. This would put the subfield in conversation with its natural partners, as opposed to the current situation of limited cross-fertilization that hinders progress in the study of political effectiveness.

Our knowledge of the political effectiveness of non-state violence is more robust than it was in 1975 and 1983, when Andrew Mack and Martha Crenshaw noted, respectively, "The outcome of 'asymmetric conflicts' as described in this paper has been almost totally neglected," and "the outcomes of campaigns of terrorism have been largely ignored."[92] Nonetheless, Crenshaw's subsequent claim that "we know little about the links between terrorism and major political change," still rings true.[93] Overall, this analysis

[91] The number of scholars who have conducted two-level analyses of non-state violence is comparable to those who have analyzed organizational effectiveness. Crenshaw offered the earliest and best attempt to lay out the two types of approaches side by side in one study. Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches." Mia Bloom was the most explicit: "Islamic extremist groups sending out suicide bombers are participating in a two-level game. Their attacks are intended to hurt Israel while at the same time undermine the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority." Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 36. In addition to the numerous works cited in earlier sections, see Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002); David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (2009); Jennifer Keister, "States Within States: How Rebels Rule" (PhD Diss., University of California, San Diego, 2011); Kathleen Cunningham, Kristin M. Bakke, and Lee J. M. Seymour, "Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow : Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-Determination Disputes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (February 2012); Paul Staniland, "Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia," *International Security* 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012).

[92] Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," 176. Martha Crenshaw, ed. *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), 5. The subfield is not alone in its relative lack of scholarship on political effects, which Marco Giugni explains: "As several scholars have pointed out at different times, the study of the consequences of social movements is one of the most neglected topics in the literature . . . The lack of scholarly work on this topic is all the more unfortunate if we consider that one of the raisons d'être of social movements is to bring about changes in some aspects of society, a fundamental goal of movements which is often acknowledged but only rarely addressed explicitly." Marco Giugni, "How Social Movements Matter: Past Research, Present Problems, Future Developments," in *How Social Movements Matter*, eds., Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), xiv–xv.

[93] Martha Crenshaw, ed. *Terrorism in Context* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 22.

suggests that scholars need to recognize the real sources of their current debate, expand their concept of effectiveness to better capture organizational outcomes, and move beyond an exclusive reliance on unitary coercers and single-level frameworks for the political effectiveness of non-state violence. It is hoped that this examination of concept, method, and empirics will help the growing subfield on the political effectiveness of non-state violence to consolidate its advances and lay the groundwork for future progress.